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Roger Crisp
University of Oxford
Reino Unido
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v. 23 n. 1-2 (2019), Artículos por invitación, plugins.themes.xejournal.article.pages 9-35
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15304/t.23.1-2.6781
plugins.themes.xejournal.currentIssueSubmitted: 26-04-2020 plugins.themes.xejournal.currentIssueAccepted: 14-05-2020 plugins.themes.xejournal.currentIssuePublished: 26-04-2020
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In this paper, Roger Crisp offers an account of Hume’s theory of virtue. Crisp claims that the central place of virtue in Hume’s ethics gives Hume an extremely sophisticated position that virtue ethics cannot afford to ignore. In particular, he argues that though Hume’s position may ultimately be described as motive utilitarian, it is both an extremely sophisticated form of motive utilitarianism, and one which may remove the very possibility of non-utilitarian virtue ethics.


 

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