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Roger Crisp
University of Oxford
United Kingdom
Biography
Vol 23 No 1-2 (2019), Artículos por invitación, pages 9-35
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15304/t.23.1-2.6781
Submitted: 26-04-2020 Accepted: 14-05-2020 Published: 26-04-2020
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Abstract

In this paper, Roger Crisp offers an account of Hume’s theory of virtue. Crisp claims that the central place of virtue in Hume’s ethics gives Hume an extremely sophisticated position that virtue ethics cannot afford to ignore. In particular, he argues that though Hume’s position may ultimately be described as motive utilitarian, it is both an extremely sophisticated form of motive utilitarianism, and one which may remove the very possibility of non-utilitarian virtue ethics.


 

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