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Xavier De Donato Rodríguez
Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, España
Espanha
v. 20 n. 1 (2015): SIEU 2014 TERCER SEMINARIO INTERNACIONAL 26-27 JUNIO 2014 (PRIMERA PARTE), SIEU 2014 SEMINARIO INTERNACIONAL 26-27 JUNIO 2014 UNIVERSIDAD DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA, ESPAÑA, plugins.themes.xejournal.article.pages 51-68
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15304/t.20.1.2517
plugins.themes.xejournal.currentIssueSubmitted: 14-04-2015 plugins.themes.xejournal.currentIssueAccepted: 14-04-2015 plugins.themes.xejournal.currentIssuePublished: 15-07-2015
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My aim in this paper is to discuss Mill’s notions of logic and argument and to highlight the epistemic dimension that for Mill has every argument and that, it is in the light of this epistemic dimension, that an argument should be assessed. By taking into account these considerations, I focus on his criticism against deductive arguments to the effect that they commit the fallacy of begging the question. I try to show that this idea relies on his radical empiricism and argue that he is wrong. He particularly fails to recognize how we can gain knowledge from deductive arguments, though their conclusions are already contained in the premises. Finally, I point out the fact that, by his insisting in the epistemic dimension of arguments, Mill’s ideas are closer to those of argumentative theorists.

DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.15304/t.20.1.2517

 

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