The justification of normative decisions
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Abstract
Some normative decision-makers tend to consider their decisions fully justified if they tackle a well-documented social problem by carefully respecting the Legal Framework and working with rational tools. On these basis, in a subtle way, the justification of normative decision-making slips to that typical of individual decisions.
When justifying normative decisions with concepts that are specific to individual decision making, not only the optimizing purpose is affected but transparency is also hit hard with negative consequences on control and balance of power. Actually, this fact is very concerning.
Trying to clarify the issue, the specific mechanisms that are suitable for constructing and justifying each type of decision are shown here, and the various forms of rationality are also put in evidence.
The concept of isomorphism between the logical form of the problems and the structure of the theoretical model that aims to justify them is crucial and frames the semantics of the analysis.
Due to the complexity inherent in regulatory decisions, their construction and justification will always move in a conditional/probabilistic environment, an environment that suits very well with democratic ethos.
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