Utilitarianism and the value of objectivity
Article Sidebar
Published:
03-02-2015
Main Article Content
Vol 20 No 2 (2015), Debates contemporáneos sobre utilitarismo, pages 85-101
Submitted: 18-10-2014
Accepted: 04-11-2014
Published: 03-02-2015
Abstract
In this paper I will evaluate the normative assumptions of Nozick's experience machine. I try to show that the intrinsic value that experiment gives to objectivity should be rejected from utilitarianism and that subjectivity counts as a necessary and sufficient condition for moral evaluation. I also conclude that satisfaction preferences utilitarianism to stay within the boundaries of utilitarianism should be considered as broad mental states consequentialism.
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.15304/t.20.2.2192
Keywords:
experiences machine, objectivity, intrinsic value, mental states
Cited by
Article Details
Most read articles by the same author(s)
- Federico Germán Abal, ¿Puede existir un deber de sacrificar la propia vida para salvar la de terceros? , Télos: Vol 23 No 1-2 (2019)