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Federico Germán Abal
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
Argentina
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4829-9510
Biografía
Vol. 23 Núm. 1-2 (2019), Artículos, Páginas 67-93
Recibido: 22-04-2020 Aceptado: 03-07-2020 Publicado: 10-08-2020
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Resumen

En un brevísimo artículo, James Sterba sostiene que existe un deber moral de sacrificar la propia vida para salvar la de terceros. Sterba fundamenta ese deber trazando una analogía con una serie de casos en los que comúnmente se aceptaría algún grado de sacrificio en beneficio de terceros. En el presente trabajo, sostengo que el argumento formulado por Sterba llega a la conclusión correcta, pero es invalido. Asimismo, señalo dos argumentos diferentes que podrían utilizarse para fundamentar la existencia de un deber de sacrificar la propia vida para salvar la de terceros.

Detalles del artículo

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