Libertad salvo daño. Sobre una posible interpretación libertariana de J. S. Mill

Abstract

It is far from exceptional to find libertarian interpretations of Mill, often among libertarian authors. Such interpretation can be admitted if Libertarianism is taken in its minimal sense. However, there are two related points that make this interpretation problematic. The first one is related with the interpretation of “harm” in the Principle of Liberty. We read “harm” in terms of rights and turn to Utilitarianism for an understanding on Mill’s position on rights. The second question concerns the treatment of negative and positive rights and duties. While from a libertarian point of view only the State has such duties (with the exception of some special duties that some individuals have), Mill’s view is that individuals also have positive duties. My view is that such positive duties could be enforced without renouncing the Principle of Liberty (though this enforcement is rarely convenient for pragmatic reasons) and that this utilitarian point, difficult to harmonize with customary libertarian positions, is supported by the moral irrelevance attributed by utilitarians to the act/omission distinction.