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Esperanza Guisán
Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
España
Vol. 5 Núm. 1 (1996): La polémica entre John Harsanyi y Amartya Sen., Artículos
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15304/t.5.1.713
Recibido: 14-01-2013 Aceptado: 14-01-2013 Publicado: 01-01-2003
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Resumen

Emphasis is placed in the need of taking persons seriously instead of only taking their rights seriously. Accordingly human well-being (physical, psychological and moral) is a «trump» against any sort of consideration about alleged rights that could go counter human development and well-being.

Instead of current talk about classical rights such as liberty, freedom and dignity, too formal and too abstract, the paper deals with three main rights that prove to be more promising:

1) The right to be considered as a being whose suffering is to be minimized.

2) The right to a free, full personal development.

and 3) The right to receive care and sympathy.

Against current theories of rights a plea is made for enlightened and enlarged sympathy as the foundation of rights and ethics, thus avoiding the partiality that infects Dworkin's and many other's theories of private ethics.

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