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Eze Paez
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Espanha
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v. 19 n. 1-2 (2012), Ética aplicada, plugins.themes.xejournal.article.pages 61-74
plugins.themes.xejournal.currentIssueSubmitted: 18-08-2014 plugins.themes.xejournal.currentIssueAccepted: 10-09-2014 plugins.themes.xejournal.currentIssuePublished: 01-11-2014
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Resumo

In this article I elaborate upon four different categories of practical reasons and the possible combinations they admit. These are explained by appeal to the four different ways in which the obtainment of a state of affairs can be valuable. First, I explain the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative values. Second, I distinguish between person-affecting and impersonal values. The combination of these categories produces six possible ways in which the obtainment of a state of affairs can be valuable —four basic and two derived. It also shows that it is not possible for something to be at the same time both agent-neutrally and agent-relatively valuable.

DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.15304/t.19.1-2.2100

 

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