Mercados vs mecanismos y sus impactos sobre los servicios de salud
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Los mecanismos de asignación en uso en los mercados de médicos internistas heredaron de la teoría del emparejamiento, de la cual presentamos una breve introducción, de propriedades normativas atractivas, en particular permite proveer un mayor bienestar a los médicos e implementar asignaciones de internos a hospitales estables. Contrastamos las ventajas y desventajas teóricas de un mercado centralizado respecto a uno descentralizado bajo la óptica de la propiedad de emparejamiento por tipos similares.
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