Markets vs mechanisms and its respective impacts on healthcare system

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Published: 03-09-2024

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David Cantala
Centro de Estudios Económicos. El Colegio de México, Carretera Picacho Ajusco 20 Ampliación Fuentes del Pedregal, C.P. 14110, Tlalpan, Ciudad de México, México
Mexico
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1011-8494
Grisel Ayllón Aragón
Tecnologico de Monterrey, Av. Eugenio Garza Sada 2501 Sur, Tecnológico, 64700, Monterrey, Nuevo León, México
Mexico
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1011-8494
Vol 33 No 3 (2024), Articles, pages 1-28
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15304/rge.33.3.9472
Submitted: 25-10-2023 Accepted: 23-02-2024 Published: 03-09-2024
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Abstract

Real life mechanisms used to assign doctors to hospitals inherit properties from matching theory, it enhances the welfare of interns and allows to implement interns to hospital in a stable way. We briefly review matching theory, then discuss the advantages and drawbacks of these centralized markets vs decentralized ones using the property of assortative matchings as main analytical tool.

Keywords:

Doctors, Mechanisms, Decentralized markets
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