4.1. The aim of the directive

It is claimed that the directive proposal, “[…] pursues the objective of improving the functioning of the internal market, while promoting more sustainable consumption” (European Commission, 2023b, p. 14). The main aim is to improve the internal market whereas more sustainable consumption is seen almost as a byproduct. In order to achieve these goals, the European Commission sets out to lay down some rules regulating repair under and beyond the legal guarantee to ensure homogeneity and competition in the repair market at the European level. Regarding the promotion of sustainable consumption by increasing repair, the European Commission identifies two main problems: first, even under the legal guarantee, replacement tends to be preferred over repair (European Commission, 2023a); second, when no longer under the legal guarantee, unfavourable conditions make repair unlikely. Promoting the repair of goods means increasing the likelihood of repair happening both under and beyond the legal guarantee (European Commission, 2023a).

4.2. Preparatory work and the drafting process

As with other regulations, this EU directive proposal drafted by the European Commission is the result of an extensive preparatory operation in which many stakeholders were involved. In this section, firstly, we examine the available documents that report on the consultations with the stakeholders, as well as the expected effects of the measures. Secondly, we assess the Impact Assessment report (European Commission, 2023a), where the procedural information is included.

4.2.3. Expected environmental and socioeconomic impacts

The summary of the expected impacts can be found in Table 6. Impact assessment was carried out on the effectiveness of the policy options, which included the effect on sustainable consumption and the environment and the economic effect in costs and benefits for the agents.

The process of evaluating the impacts began with a study of a sample of 7 products affected by the directive. Based on an in-depth analysis, it estimated the expected impacts of the possible policy measures on the sampled markets, and then extrapolated them to the entire internal market. Based on the expected effect on reduced consumption and increased repair, social, economic and environmental effects were calculated and attributed to each agent (European Commission, 2023a).

For instance, reduced consumption would imply consumer savings, but also reduced turnover for producers and sellers, which would translate into less employment in the affected sectors. In addition, reduced consumption would also mean savings in terms of resource usage and emissions. Increased repair, on the other hand, would have an effect on employment, partially or even fully, making up for the effects of reduced consumption. Increases in repair would also ensure that the material needs of customers were met without considerably increasing the environmental impacts. Administrative costs would apply to the policy options that would incorporate information requirements.

4.3. The selection of policy options

Based upon the preparatory work, a set of policy options was finally chosen. The possible policy options considered were divided into 2 main clusters, the first covering repair under the legal guarantee, the second covering repair after the legal guarantee. A total of 13 specific policy options were proposed, of which only 7 were accepted into the final proposal.

Table 7 presents all the options that were considered and those that were rejected. Only one policy option dealing with repair during the legal guarantee period was adopted, that being PO1A. Although PO1B was preferred overall by most of the parties involved in the consultations, it would have had the same effect as PO1A, since in the event that the cost of repair were greater, the producer would have the prerogative to opt for a replacement anyway. Measures outside the legal guarantee period essentially include the creation of a matchmaking platform, mandatory and voluntary commitments and the obligation imposed on producers to repair.

These measures can be presented in an alternative way, emphasising the synergies that can be found among them and the general aims to which they contribute. Table 8 shows two main groups of policy measures working in synergy: (1) convenience and transparency and (2) mandate to repair. The first one aims to improve trust among consumers while the goal of the second one is to increase the chance of repair both under and after the legal guarantee period.

A platform that can connect repairers and customers which is yet to be implemented aims to introduce an innovative tool to allow customers to contact repairers. It might, however, create an exclusion effect of repairers that do not meet the standards set by member states or that cannot meet the level of demand of such a platform. It works in synergy with the obligation to use standard forms when an enquiry about a repair is made, as well as with the adherence to voluntary standards. The use of a standard form will allow for comparability and since the conditions stated in this form, particularly the price, will be binding in the case of a contract being agreed, it also gives reassurance to the consumer. The ‘easy to repair’ standard assures consumers that repairers will meet certain conditions. The whole idea behind these four policy options is to facilitate contact between potential customers and repairers, and to provide the former with certainty and information. These measures tackle the perception of repairs and repairers as untrustworthy (Packard, 1961; Krebs & Hoppenheit, 2020; Nazli, 2021).

The obligation to repair works alongside the information requirements and the guaranteed provisions. It constitutes one of the most innovative measures of this directive but has failed to properly serve its cause. The obligation is limited to products for which repairability requirements already exist (see Section 3). In short, some of the obstacles regarding access to repair and design were already covered by the ecodesign provisions. Prioritisation of repair when under guarantee works in synergy with the obligation to repair, since both require the same infrastructure by the producers, meaning that it is likely that in both cases, the goods would go through the authorised repair channels. Information requirements, in the context of this directive, just oblige the producer or seller to state whether they repair or not and under what conditions. Information in this context does not refer to manuals or schematics useful to perform repairs.

5.1. Discussing the repair barriers identified by the European Commission

The classification of the barriers set by the European Commission is rather incomplete when contrasted with the evidence provided by the growing body of literature around the economy of repair. The European Commission’s assessment ignores some of the most important barriers to repair while they downplay others. Out of the barriers which it does recognise, some are deliberately excluded from the scope of the directive. In Table 5, we find the barriers to repair identified by the European Commission in its Impact Assessment Report (European Commission, 2023a). In this section we critically assess these barriers based on the existing literature on the subject.

An in-depth analysis of the barriers identified in the literature allows us to see that the assessment by the EC is lacking in several aspects. For instance, access barriers to repair (those that impede repair altogether) are not present, with the exception of Driver 1. Under the legal guarantee period, products can be repaired or replaced. Until now, this depended upon a negotiation between the parties, which mostly resulted in replacements because consumers tended to feel entitled to new products when their ones were damaged (European Commission, 2023a). The policy measures adopted by the directive in regard to guarantee may have a positive , albeit limited, effect, since most defects occur outside of the legal guarantee period (European Commission, 2023a). No mention is made to barriers such as intellectual property, patent law or copyright, which play a fundamental role in impeding repair (Svensson, et al., 2018; Grinval & Tur Sinai, 2019; Dalhammar, et al., 2020). Nothing is stated either about the availability of spare parts and tools, or the prices they could charge, which could also inhibit repairs (Türkeli, et al., 2019; Riisgard, et al., 2016; Andersson, et al., 2018; Graziano & Trogal, 2017).

Since Driver 4 of the EC seems to refer to the cost of repair, this implies that the directive should try to make prices more transparent: “[I]t is not in the realm of this initiative to influence factors that have an effect on prices; the resulting prices will largely be determined by the market.” (European Commission, 2023a, p. 17). In addition, the economic attractiveness of repair is actually dependent upon the relative prices of the repair. This means that both the prices of repair and replacement affect the likelihood of the final outcome. Making new products more expensive so that their actual cost to society and to the environment are represented could be a way of persuading consumers to repair (Stahel, 2013). It should be taken into account that the propensity to repair drops drastically when the repair cost exceeds 25% of the price of the replacement (McCollough, 2007, 2009). Measures taken to make repairs more economically attractive have only been adopted at the national level (see Section 3). This proposal does not attempt to improve the economic attractiveness of repair compared to replacement.

Some forms of obsolescence are covered by Drivers 5 and 6, which have been deliberately excluded from the scope of the directive. Nonetheless, obsolescence is a much broader notion than what these drivers suggest. It can be defined as the process by which products are phased out and it comes in many forms, most notably material obsolescence, functional obsolescence and psychological obsolescence (Packard, 1961). The former commonly refers to design decisions and how they affect repairability (de Fusco, 2005; Packard, 1960; Öko-Institut e.V., 2020). The second type refers to technological change and innovation that can render objects obsolete (Packard, 1960; Öko-Institut e.V., 2020), which is absent from the European Commission’s drivers, even though it had been discussed at the consultation phase (see Appendix A). The latter regards obsolescence perceived in the mind of the consumer (Packard, 1960; Öko-Institut e.V., 2020); this mostly used to be associated with fashion, but today it also implies a conscious decision by the consumer based on a multitude of factors (Svensson-Hoglund et al., 2023).

Convenience and trust is a recurring theme surrounding the feasibility of repair (Packard, 1960; Wieser & Tröger, 2017; Ackermann, et al., 2018; Nazli, 2021; Rogers, et al., 2021), a barrier which is one of the main points of this directive (see Table 8), reflected in Drivers 2 and 3. Indeed, most of the policy options proposed in this directive are information-related, because they are said to create a more transparent, and more competitive, repair market. Information, in this case, does not refer to technical information that would be useful for conducting repairs, like manuals or design schematics, but rather to market information about the repair conditions exclusively, like price, whether transportation is included or if substitution devices are provided as part of the contract.

An incorrect assessment of the barriers would affect the potential of any regulation because, as a result, the measures proposed would not properly tackle the fundamental issues. This directive is no exception in this regard. The drivers identified by the EC are narrow and limited, leaving most of the actual barriers to repair out of the equation. No real measures have been taken to address obsolescence in any of its forms nor to adjust the relative prices of repair to make it more attractive. Only those regarding trust and transparency have been taken on board, which makes sense, since the main objective of this directive is to incentivise competition in the common market, and sustainable consumption is just an addendum. Access barriers to repair have been addressed in this directive with the mandate for the manufacturer to repair, yet this measure falls short of its expectations, as it only covers products for which repairability criteria already exist, or might exist in the future (see Section 3). This interpretation of R2R as an obligation to repair is a form of closed access to repair (Svensson et al., 2018), meaning that the barriers in this case are removed but only if the consumer goes through the established channels set by the manufacturer.

5.2. The role of stakeholders in the drafting process

The consultation process with the stakeholders was biased from the beginning, since the policy options had already been decided upon prior to the meeting. The measures about which the participants were asked were limited to some aspects of repair under the legal guarantee period and the R2R. Examples of questions raised about the legal guarantees enquired about prioritising repair, extending the liability period, using second-hand and refurbished goods as replacements under the legal guarantee and liability periods for second-hand and refurbished goods. All these measures were rejected by manufacturers and member states (see Appendix A). Only prioritising repair under the legal guarantee period received some support and was included in the proposal, restricted to when the cost of replacing the defective item with a new one exceeded the cost of having it repaired.

The results of the consultation are also biased due to the overrepresentation of businesses and business organisations. Regarding the preferred option to perform a repair (European Commission, 2023a), the respondents answered in order of preference: manufacturers, independent repairers, sellers and consumers. This suggests that manufacturers are trusted the most to perform repairs, which is convenient, given the position of the directive emphasising the importance of trust and the central role of manufacturers in the mandate to repair. If we were to exclude the manufacturers’ answers from the total, most respondents would actually prefer independent repairers, followed by manufacturers, consumers themselves and finally sellers. Thus, it was businesses and their overrepresentation in the sample that gave the false impression of DIY repairs and independent repairers being less desirable, when they are generally preferred by citizens, consumer organisations and NGOs. The closed and narrow R2R proposed by the directive transfers the control of the repair process over to the manufacturers.

The R2R comments made by manufacturers were mostly negative. The positions held by industry representatives emphasised the need for voluntary commitments and information requirements, i.e. matchmaking platforms. Overall, they argued that repair should be left for the market to resolve, which in turn would mean allowing producers to set the conditions for repair with control over the supply and price of spare parts and information. The French Association of Large Companies stated, “When [the legal guarantee] ends, repairability offered by companies are rising through healthy competition. A right to repair isn't needed” (sic). Microsoft rejects obsolescence altogether, saying, “the factors ranked above assume design obsolescence, which is an inaccurate assumption”. Many businesses claimed that there would be security and safety concerns in regard to open access to repair, reiterated by the European Garden Machinery Industry Federation, “[W]e also warn about the safety and responsibility risk associated with independent repairers that are not qualified for EEE and might not execute repairs in the correct way as a professional would”. For Amazon, “Repair by manufacturers will incentivise the best design for the longer use of goods”. Most businesses showed doubts about what the intentions of the EC were with R2R, probably given the fact that the mandate to repair is a fairly new approach to the R2R (European Commission, 2023d) and they struggled to have a clear idea of how it would work. For instance, during the public consultation, only four times did concerns for the independent repair sector emerge and the consequences of an R2R scheme that would not improve the conditions for independent repairers. In total, the R2R regulation was rejected thirty times, with the general consensus being that legal guarantees should stay as they were.

In contrast, during the call for evidence, most repair initiatives considered the challenges that repair would have to face, highlighting the need to access information, ensure the availability of spare parts, even if they were IP-protected, and the need for ease of disassembly. Most notably, they observed that there was a need for financial incentives for the repair sector. They also stated that R2R should support independent repairers. One repairer felt that it was necessary to “[e]nsure that individual products [would be] easy to repair and spare parts [would be] available”. iFixit encouraged policy makers to grant access to information and spare parts, even non-OEM ones, whilst it stressed the importance of “ensur[ing that] these measures appl[ied] to all product categories, and not only for those that the Commission [was] already partly regulating with ecodesign regulations”. A car repairer encouraged the “liberalisation of designs on vehicle parts” and financial measures to bring production back to Europe and tax the import of parts that did not meet environmental criteria. This was in unison with the positions held by independent repairers’ associations (AIRC, CLEPA, ECAR, FIGIEFA, Insurance Europe & SMEunited, 2023).

The majority of the member states were mostly unsure of the policy options proposed, with many showing no clear position and most of them refusing to go beyond promoting repair under the legal guarantee period. The crucial role played by the RSB must not be overlooked, bearing in mind that, at the time of writing, they had turned down the proposal once, on the grounds that there was a lack of quantitative economic estimates (Nogueira, 2024; European Commission, 2023c). The insistence on expected economic impacts rather than on environmental or distributive ones exemplifies the RSB’s clear priorities towards the economic and growth-oriented dimension of the regulatory measures rather than their potential for sustainability. This in turn is reflected in the aim of the directive, which puts the functioning of the internal market at the forefront, overshadowing sustainability.

Overwhelmingly, it was the criteria of businesses and business organisations that were adopted, both in terms of the barriers to repair and the policy measures. The focus on information and the market’s supposed freedom to set the conditions for prices coincide with the opinions of the manufacturers. The narrow selection of products covered in this proposal is the result of their refusing to select product categories, claiming that R2R should be determined on a sector-specific approach or by manufacturers themselves. R2R, as proposed in the directive, benefits manufacturers almost exclusively, since it ensures control over the emerging repair market. This goes in line with evidence provided in the literature on the subject. Manufacturers are lobbying to delay and control the implementation of R2R (Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, 2019), while exerting control over independent repairers through IP and trademark legislation (Svensson-Hoglund et al., 2021).

5.3. Environmental and socioeconomic considerations

The shift from production to repair that could come from this directive would have positive effects, since repair is less resource-intensive and thus less damaging to the environment. Nonetheless, there is no certainty that this shift will result in an income transfer from manufacturers to repairers.

It was argued during the preparatory work that consumer savings resulting from these measures could be redirected towards investment that could lead to more growth in the long run. Production and growth, which are intrinsically linked, are the main drivers of environmental impacts. The environmental benefits of increased repair may not be reaped if the ultimate objective of the directive is to achieve growth. So far, growth has been the result of an increase in material and energy use, even if the growth rate of the environmental impacts is lower than the growth rate of the economy, referred to as relative decoupling. Growth that derives from a reduction in resource usage, known as absolute decoupling, is, for the time being, a fantasy.

Another aspect that may cast doubt over this directive is connected with transportation. Currently, when a product becomes defective under the legal guarantee period, it is not unusual for manufacturers to have to ship it to a specific location to have it repaired. If the same logic were to apply to any repair under the obligation to repair, the emissions required to ship the product back and forth would partially compensate for the savings. If the directive were able to expand the current network of internal and authorised repairers, the effect of transportation rebound effect might be less intense. In this case, it would be up to the manufacturers to determine how to deal with this requirement.

Repair can be a form of partial decoupling, meaning that growth can be achieved in the form of services while no new products are being manufactured. In terms of the socioeconomic impacts, it has been observed that there would likely be a shift from production to repair. The way this shift would take place is not clear. The R2R proposed in the directive proposal is conceived for producers and their authorised repair services. At the same time, it would create administrive burdens on independent repairers in the form of bureaucratic requirements, without providing them with additional tools to overcome the barriers to repair. Thus, the shift from production to repair provided for in this directive proposal would not necessarily alter the current distribution of wealth between manufacturers and independent repairers, since a percentage from the economic transfers to the repair sector would go back to the manufacturers through their official repair services.