Is phenomenal consciousness a necessary condition for intentionality? Limitations of phenomenalist inseparatism

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Published: 28-11-2018

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Asier Arias Domínguez
Spain
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Vol 38 No 1 (2019), Studies
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15304/ag.38.1.4408
Submitted: 05-11-2017 Accepted: 28-02-2018 Published: 28-11-2018
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Abstract

One of the main dividing lines within the debate on the problem of consciousness comes between representationalist separatism and phenomenalist inseparatism. According to the former, representational mental states are possible in the absence of phenomenal consciousness, and furthermore, an adequate naturalistic theory of representation is necessary and sufficient for the explanation of phenomenal consciousness. According to the later, phenomenal consciousness is necessary for the existence and the explanation of any representational state and, indeed, of any mental state. Several arguments have tried to offer support to this inseparatist thesis. Those proposed by Galen Strawson and John Searle summarize this kind of argument, which is based on the introduction of implicit premises. In addition to this failure, inseparatism faces the problems of its empirical inoperativeness and inadequacy, as well as its lack of phylogenetic verisimilitude.

Keywords:

inseparatism, representation, mind, consciousness, intentionality
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