Merleau-Ponty’s reply to “pessimistic induction” as a possible complement of his polemics against skepticism

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Published: 30-11-2017

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Claudio Javier Cormick
Universidad del Salvador Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Tecnológicas
Argentina
Biography
Vol 37 No 1 (2018), Studies
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15304/ag.37.1.3849
Submitted: 03-01-2017 Accepted: 21-06-2017 Published: 30-11-2017
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Abstract

In this article, we will attempt to complete the existing analysis of the relationship between Merleau-Ponty and different skeptical positions—which has been typically restricted to more “canonical” texts—on the basis of his conference about Le primat de la perception.
In that text, the phenomenologist argues against the “pessimistic induction” according to which, in light of the refutation of past scientific hypotheses, we can foresee that the current ones are false as well: turning the conclusion of this induction into its contrary, Merleau-Ponty claims that the transformations in our knowledge are a self-corrective process, such that a hypothesis is only abandoned if another one appears as a better alternative. This will lead us to problematize the notion of scientific refutation in Merleau-Ponty, who offers, as a model for epistemic progress, the mutual (“spontaneous”) substitution of perceptive beliefs, which does not involve a conscious consideration of rational criteria. As we will point out, this starting point can not be extended to the case of hypotheses which are evaluated according to their respective values.

Keywords:

Merleau-Ponty, skepticism, pessimistic induction, refutation, perception
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