1. INTRODUCTION

The years 2020 and 2021 explicitly highlighted the challenges associated with cross-border cooperation (hereafter: CBC). The will among public authorities for CBC is present, but the cooperation cannot yet sufficiently prevent citizens from being hindered by the effects of their proximity to the national border. This became evident for example during Covid19 in many European borderlands. One of these borderland is the Dutch-German borderland. An area characterised by decades of strong tradition in cross-border cooperation and lively border dynamics. Here Covid19 clearly highlighted the dichotomy between two very different narratives: that of citizens at grassroots level on the one hand and that of the euroregional network on the other hand. Or, to put it another way, an unpredictable daily reality at the border versus good but often insufficiently forceful intentions to prevent citizens from the barrier effect of the border.

In one narrative, citizens and companies experienced in recent years the negative consequences of living and conducting business in the borderland. Due to Covid19, their daily urban system was split into two different realities at times, due to the differences in legislation, policy and measures enforced by the different member states of the European Union. In addition, systematic monitoring of Covid19-related data often tailed off completely at national borders (Cloosterman et al., 2020), which resulted in crossing the border becoming an even greater barrier. Furthermore, unambiguous communication in the border regions generally left much to be desired, making it difficult for example for tourists, students and employees to find out what measures were in force in places just a few kilometres away from their homes. From a consumer perspective, at moments, crossing the border to go shopping was made nearly impossible, even for those who normally do their daily shopping in a supermarket or pharmacy on the other side of the border.

Also, retailers in the border region that rely heavily on consumers from the neighbouring country were hit particularly hard by this dissuasion policy designed to prevent cross-border movement. While food retail benefited massively from the lockdowns, this was not the case for food retailers targeting consumers from the neighbouring country. And finally, a recent study by the Institute for Transnational and Euregional cross-border cooperation and Mobility (2020) shows that little consideration was given to the border regions when rolling out national measures to keep the coronavirus under control. As a result, entrepreneurs who work in one country and live across the border in a neighbouring country were not eligible for compensation in some cases, for example, the temporary financial support arrangement for entrepreneurs.

The other narrative is that of the existing euroregional network, which is primarily made up of administrators, politicians and government bodies. A network that sustains itself through mutual congratulation. Something which is perfectly understandable in view of the exemplary role that administrators and other public figures have in fostering and facilitating CBC. However, the way the network fulsomely praised the excellent coordination between the neighbouring countries during the Covid19 crisis was rather questionable, especially for those who, during covid19, are particularly affected by the lack of bi-national coordination (Grenslandconferentie, 2020). Besides, there is no doubt that cooperation has also led to success, for example, in making hospital beds available to patients from across the border.

It is true that a positive message is what citizens and above all the euroregional network needs in order to keep people aware of opportunities across borders. However, in times of crisis, it is precisely the proper management of negative effects that should be given priority. Nonetheless, many citizens and entrepreneurs suffered from the lack of adequate CBC. In most cases, the national administrations on each side of the border only took action when citizens and entrepreneurs had already been subjected to extreme duress.

Covid19 has clearly shown that CBC is anything but self-evident along Europe’s internal borders. Years of step-by-step policies towards more intensive CBC have suddenly been shattered by an unexpected crisis. On top of that, according to recent research by Cloosterman et al. (2020), border regions are less resilient and actually more vulnerable to sudden economic shocks like that caused by the Covid19 pandemic than more inland regions, which in turn is partly caused by the proximity of the national border (Janssen and Dagevos, 2022). This once more demonstrates the importance of CBC, both for shock prevention and shock response.

The above findings concern only a few indicators that reveal something about the impact of CBC. Nevertheless, these indicators show that the cooperation seems to be not robust enough in times of crisis. There is a serious chance that crises such as Covid19 would have lesser impact if CBC would be more intensive. That CBC can have an impact on for example the agglomeration force and resilience of the cross-border region, has already been demonstrated in several studies (Actieteam Grensoverschrijdende Economie en Arbeid, 2017; Centraal Planbureau, 2016; Pijnenburg, 2019a). Despite the fact that governments on both sides of the border are increasingly developing policies aimed at CBC, which is evidenced by, among other things, the Dutch government's 'Regio Deals’1, the unprecedented opportunities of CBC remain mere words, confined to policy papers.

This paper aims to present a bird’s eye view on cooperation in the Dutch-German borderland in recent decades. The observation that Covid19 has shown that CBC along the Dutch-German border still has a long way to go before citizens are capable in optimally using the opportunities a border context is providing them, calls for a perspective on the cooperation as it is today, and at the same time for practice oriented guidelines for action in order to improve and enhance the robustness the cooperation. The purpose of this study is not to examine the effectiveness of different cross-border policy instruments like the European Union's financing tool INTERREG, but to identify a number of principles for cross-border cooperation for the future. The formulation and implementation of such principles is a step that precedes the development of policy instruments.

2. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Action research in the Dutch-German borderland

This study, from a methodological perspective, is characterised by a mixed methods approach. The most common quantitative and qualitative data collection methods have been used: statistical data and document analysis, interviews and observations and. The data collection has been an ongoing process in 2020 and 2021 of exploring the Dutch-German border landscape. It can be seen as an itinerary, a series of actions and activities implemented to engage stakeholders and civil society in cross-border cooperation. Interviews were conducted with representatives from government, business, politics and education from both sides of the border. In addition, several workshops and webinars were attended for observational purposes.

The border between Germany and the Netherlands has been a fairly stable area for the last 200 years and, as a border between two members of the Schengen Agreement, it is also largely barrier-free. Physically crossing the border is unimpeded by any obstacles. Though, the border is more than just a line on the map and still affects our mind-sets and habitual approach to daily life and work, which are coloured by a primarily inland-oriented focus. This is one of the reasons why CBC remains necessary.

The Dutch-German borderland is characterised by the presence of several euroregions. This study focuses on the Dutch-German Venlo – Lower Rhine region (Figure 1). This area is located primarily within the territory of the long-standing public body – founded in 1978 – ‘euroregion rhine-meuse-north’. The euroregion rhine-meuse-north (henceforth: euroregion), as one of the four binational cross-border regions along the Dutch-German border, can be spatially classified (Sohn and Stambolic, 2015), from a European perspective, as a polycentric in-between border region amidst three metropolitan core areas, i.e. the Randstad, the Ruhr Area and the Flemish Diamond. Since the borderscape is a flexible concept, it is not possible to frame a cross-border relational space in one spatial grammar, that of territory. Using the term euroregion, is solely intended to be able to make it workable as a subject of study.

The euroregion under study forms an important logistical-economic connection between the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam and the European hinterland. The economic composition of the region is fairly unambiguous on both sides of the border: agri-food, manufacturing and logistics are the three most strongly represented economic sectors (Pijnenburg and Szillat, 2021). In addition, from a cross-border mobility perspective, there is a strong cross-border dynamic in the areas of tourism and retail. A study by Van Lieshout and Lenderink (2020) shows that Germans spend 691 million euros annually in the Province of Limburg, the area that includes the Dutch part of the euroregion, for daily shopping and recreational purposes.

Figure 1.The Dutch-German euroregion rhine-meuse-north 

Note. From euroregion rhine-meuse-north (2022).

3. DYNAMICS IN THE DUTCH-GERMAN BORDERLAND

CBC in the Dutch-German borderland has increased significantly over the past years, partly thanks to the European INTERREG funding programme. At the same time, in spite of numerous good intentions, we see from a more quantitative perspective that the number of people who live, work or study on the other side of the border is still very limited. An economist would question whether the benefits of crossing national borders justify the costs. This chapter provides some quantitative facts and figures. Such data do not paint a complete picture of the dynamics in the border area, nor foresee they in a complete set with indicators in order to measure the impact of CBC. Yet they do offer an indication.

Figures from the Dutch-German Chamber of Commerce (2022) show that the trade volume between the two countries in 2021 was around 206 billion euros. The trading relationship between the Netherlands and Germany, which includes both goods and services, is only exceeded in terms of trading volume by the trading relationship between two much larger nations, the United States and Canada.

For the Netherlands, Germany is by far the most important trading partner, both in terms of imports and exports. Germany is followed at a comfortable distance by the Netherlands' only directly adjacent neighbour via land, Belgium. The Netherlands comes second to Germany when it comes to imports and fourth when it comes to exports. In addition to the Netherlands, Germany actively trades with countries such as China, France and the United States (Dutch-German Chamber of Commerce, 2022). This strong trade relationship is reflected in the goods and services trade figures. When we consider the four European freedoms - the free movement of goods, capital, services and labour - as the cornerstones of the internal European market, we see that goods and services cross national borders with little difficulty.

Figures from the national statistical agencies in the Netherlands and Germany, respectively Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek and Destatis, show that in 2021 the Netherlands has imported goods worth about 92 billion euros from Germany. On the other hand, the Netherlands has exported goods from the Netherlands to Germany worth 133 billion euros2. To put these figures into perspective. The Netherlands imported only 52 billion euros from Belgium and exported only 62 billion euros worth of goods to Belgium. Especially in the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics level 3 areas along the border (hereafter: NUTS3), many goods exporters export to neighbouring Germany. Here more than 60% from all the exporters exports at least to Germany in comparison to less than 45% in many NUTS3 regions in the western part of the country. Furthermore, almost 30% of all goods exports from the Province of Limburg go to Germany (Creemers et al., 2020).

When we look at the export of services, we see there is also a strong trade relation between the Netherlands and Germany. Services worth about 22 billion euros were imported in 2021 from Germany to the Netherlands. This is just over 10% of the total services imported to the Netherlands. Germany, in turn, imported services worth 27 billion euros from the Netherlands. Again, a comparison with Belgium shows that trade relations between the Netherlands and Germany are strong. Only 14 billion euros was imported from Belgium and 12.5 billion euros of services were exported from the Netherlands.

There can be no doubt that the sheer volume of trade, worth roughly 190 billion euros in the years before Covid-19, and 206 billion euros in 2021 is evidence of an intense trading relationship between the Netherlands and Germany. The above figures show that many companies, including those in the borderland must be involved in a certain way of business with and in the neighbouring country.

Another European freedom, the free movement of capital, is also immense between the Netherlands and Germany. Investments from the Netherlands generally end up in the German federal states of North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse and Bavaria. Of the total investment volume in Germany, 20% comes from the Netherlands (Creemers et al., 2020). The other way round, more than 10% of all capital investments from Germany flow to the Netherlands.

When we look at the free movement of ‘labour’ in Europe, the figures paint a completely different picture. There is hardly any cross-border commuting to work (i.e. labour). Figure 2 shows that in most NUTS3 regions along the Dutch-German border, the number of cross-border commuters is between 0.1 and 3% of the employed population.

Only about 43.000 people living in Germany cross the border every day to work in the Netherlands. Many of them are Dutch nationals who live in Germany and in turn work in the Netherlands. The flow in the other direction amounts to just over 9.000 people who live in the Netherlands and travel to their work in Germany (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2022). So, in spite of the Schengen Agreement, a European or euroregional labour market is still very much an illusion. In recent years, several border information points have been set up along the Dutch-German border to inform job-seekers and employers about working across borders. The future will show whether this policy will increase the number of cross-border commuters.

Figure 2.Cross-border commuters between the Netherlands and Germany in 2017 

Note. From Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek Grensdata, 2022.

Apart from employment reasons, people can also cross the border for other purposes, such as living and leisure. When it comes to living, the number of people who live on the other side of the border is small. A few years ago 77.000 Germans are residing in the Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2022). A number that has been rising steadily for years. According to Destatis, 150.530 Dutch citizens were living in Germany in 20203. Two thirds of them live in the states North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony, which border the Netherlands. Reasons for Dutch people to live in the neighbouring country are mainly the lower prices of housing and living (BPD | Bouwfonds Gebiedsontwikkeling, 2018). Germans choose the Netherlands for its social climate and the joy of living. An important reason for not living in the neighbouring country is the administrative burden.

From a leisure point of view, we see that many people find the effort worthwhile to cross national borders. The border opportunities outweigh the border barriers to such an extent that many citizens cross the border in their spare time. There is a strong cross-border flow of day trippers and tourists who have booked overnight stays. Hardly surprising, as recreation requires little in the way of preparations and effort. And the benefits are many, for example, differences in prices, product range and experience (Arts, 2021). If we disregard Covid19 for the moment, people who cross the border for leisure purposes do not have to familiarize themselves with laws and regulations. On top of that, crossing national borders gives many people even a kind of exotic holiday feeling (Eker and Van Houtum, 2013).

Other than living, working and leisure, there can be a fourth reason for crossing the border: education. For Germans, the Netherlands comes in second place behind Germany as the most popular country for a course of study. This number has increased from less than 5000 students in 2000 to almost 25000 students in recent years4. This cross-border mobility from Germany to the Netherlands is encouraged by factors such as the widespread availability of courses with English as the working language in the Netherlands and the more practice-oriented approach in Dutch universities of applied science compared to the type of education offered in the equivalent institutions in Germany. The higher education institutions in the border region in particular, such as Maastricht University and Fontys University of Applied Sciences are cleverly exploiting the proximity of German students.

Conversely, Dutch nationals who enrol for a course of study in Germany do so mainly as part of the European Union programme for education, training, youth and sport, known as the Erasmus+ programme, which only lasts for one semester. Germany, however, is not the most popular Erasmus+ destination. Most Dutch students choose to go to Spain, followed by the United Kingdom in second place. Germany is third on the list (Vereniging van Universiteiten, n.d.).

In summary, cross-border mobility is not widespread in practice. It involves a group of people who, in the border area, effectively exploit the opportunities that the border situation offers. For example, people acting in the role of consumers, entrepreneurs or tourists. The facts presented above do not present the whole story. It is therefore not fair to associate the success of CBC only with these quantitative indicators. For example, less is known about the impact of cross-border commuters on the intercultural awareness and skills of foreign colleagues in the organisation they work for, the number of companies cooperating with for example suppliers from the neighbouring country and the way students from the neighbouring country integrate into the daily dynamics of the city or region. Furthermore, the research has shown that citizens often come across CBC, but do not register it as such. For example, people work together with their colleagues from the neighbouring country, do their weekly shopping and buying fuel across the border, and have a daughter with some of their friends from the neighbouring country. In such examples, it is difficult or even impossible to directly connect these border-related dynamics to cross-border policies effects.

4. CROSS-BORDER POLICIES

When comparing the theoretical viewpoints on borders with daily practice in borderlands, an interesting paradox becomes apparent. A paradox between daily practices and dynamics in the border region on the one hand and, on the other hand, the static manner in which the border is still often seen and defined in policies. In many policy documents, the border is often still referred to as a distinct line that separates two systems, languages and cultures from each other. An integrated approach that takes into account social developments in the border region and the influence on them caused by the proximity to the state border is still awaited.

This chapter discusses the results of the interviews, observations and document analysis that together form an important part of the foundation of this study.

At the moment CBC is a hot topic, which is illustrated by among other things that the Dutch national government in recent years strongly has been paying attention to CBC. The former responsible Secretary of State oft-repeated the slogan: “growing at the border, rather than the border as barriers to growth’’ (Van Hoof, 2019). On the German side of the border, the federal state authority in North Rhine-Westphalia is also intensely interested in cooperation with the Benelux countries in particular. Even since a few years both governments together organize the annual ‘Borderland conference’5 and annually develop a ‘borderland agenda’.

In addition, a growing interest in CBC at regional level can be observed, both among regional and local authorities and within education. This is demonstrated by the cross-border focus of regional grants and the recurring consultation structures initiated by the euroregion. Furthermore, in the rhine-meuse-north euroregion, economic development boards and agencies are increasingly active in cross-border cooperation. This cooperation is strongly driven by regional public authorities. In addition, in recent decades, German-Dutch bodies have emerged, such as the Business Club Maas Rhein, in which entrepreneurs, authorities, educational parties and cultural institutions meet monthly. Education on both sides of the border is also increasingly cooperating in the rhine-meuse-north euroregion, especially at the secondary, vocational and higher education levels. These are initiatives that come about partly through Interreg, but also through new subsidy programmes aimed at German-Dutch cooperation.

The growing focus on CBC means that more and more people are involved in cross-border governance at different levels. However, as history shows us time and again, this positive focus can also evaporate almost immediately in the aftermath of elections and shock events such as 9/11. The latter event caused a change in sentiment away from CBC towards a greater focus on national sovereignty and more restrictive borders. This does not mean that projects immediately came to a standstill, but the political trend in both countries was more focused on keeping national sovereignty. Respondents are afraid that Covid19 has caused a loss of interest in the neighbouring country among citizens. One the one hand, Covid19 has forced the existing euroregional networks to engage in more intensive discussion with each other regarding health and socio-administrative policy alignment and the continuation of projects. On the other hand, citizens and entrepreneurs have clearly experienced that borders took on a much more distinctive outline due to partial border closures and dissuasion policies.

CBC continues to be heavily dependent on political interest, which makes the intensity of the cooperation susceptible to political whims. The border is often used in politics and policy, and sometimes abused, as an instrument for binary framing (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, 2002). Open versus closed, central versus peripheral, in versus out. This gives the border a hard, inflexible and moreover multifunctional character, which is diametrically opposed to the developments we see in the theory, as outlined before. The border as no more than an invisible dividing line between two regulatory systems.

Furthermore, the study shows that the Dutch-German cooperation is largely driven by individuals. A small network of enthusiasts is the driving force here. It could be referred to as a euroregional bubble. For people from outside this bubble it seems to be difficult to enter. If one of the aims of CBC is to involve young people, the euroregional network must start by defining exactly what opportunities are open to them. Most citizens will not be spurred into action by only the prospects for peace or trade. The euroregional network must ask themselves whether their message is still powerful and appealing enough for younger generation. Generations that were brought into contact with the neighbouring country in their youth to a lesser degree. Reasons for this are: the decrease of available TV channels from the neighbouring country, the fact that the subject German is no longer obligatory in secondary schools, and the increased mobility and globalisation which made people less dependent on their own region.

In addition, the study reveals that there is no clear problem owner of border related challenges. This is probably one of the causes that there is no unified vision of the borderland. The ‘common sense of urgency’ is insufficiently strong (Pijnenburg, 2019b). A clear guiding principle, a Leitmotiv, is lacking. Many parties stand to benefit from CBC, but few experience short-term negative consequences if they do not participate. Furthermore, people and companies can walk away from the border situation, in order to profit from different circumstances elsewhere, but the region itself cannot. This makes it a task that is mainly felt regionally, and that has difficulty in sinking in in the political capitals of both countries.

This theme calls for shared ownership. Many parties, from the national to the local level, benefit from cross-border cooperation, which suggests that creating a shared ownership should be likely. Governments have already taken up the challenge. Though, there is a general lack of cross-border political will to develop an integral and well thought-out approach and perspective for the borderland, as already stated in 2015 by Van Houtum and Eker (2015, p. 41). Due to the largely non-binding character of CBC to date, a lack of coherence between cross-border initiatives and the lack of a clear problem owner, the greater part of the population has not yet been reached. In other words, CBC is not yet bearing fruit in spite of its decades long history.

After years of many stand-alone initiatives, respondents emphasize that it is now time for a joint approach. An approach that is supported in both the political capitals of both countries and the region. In order to realize that, an ecosystem must be created within which it is clear what each other's strengths and pitfalls are, how parties can complement each other, and what is needed to develop effective policy. Furthermore, as a next step, in order to create a joint responsibility, the creation of an integrated and non-political vision on CBC is of utmost importance. An integrated vision of the borderland from an economic, demographic, inclusive and socio-cultural perspective, that goes beyond just that line on the map. A vision that could contribute to make the available grants, policies and actions more effective.

5. RESULTS & DISCUSSION

This study has shown that at the moment CBC is a hot topic in many political and administrative circles. As yet, the growing attention for this topic is not reflected in the statistics and sentiments on the streets. CBC is currently a phenomenon in the margins of society and therefore fragile. The cooperation is not yet sufficiently resilient to unexpected crises such as Covid19. The borderland is in need of a permanent and widely adopted focus. One of the requirements for creating an effective and inclusive vision to ensure that all those who live in the borderland can benefit from the opportunities on either side of the border, is that the euroregional network must distance itself from its current image as a hobby and plaything of public administrators. Furthermore, the Dutch-German borderland requires a clear and consistent vision, meeting the following principles: a vision that guides action; a vision that shows what it stands for and shows how the borderland as a collective aims to develop; a vision that is not fettered by political trends; and a vision that must primarily benefit ordinary citizens.

The fact that opportunities are available across the border is nothing new. This extends far beyond cheap fuel and groceries. The next question actors in the borderland must ask themselves is: how do we, as a whole, intend to exploit these opportunities? A way need to be found to reduce the ‘personal effort’ of overcoming border related barriers and increase the ‘benefits’ of crossing borders. And a final, yet not unimportant question, is who is responsible for realizing all this.

There is no such thing as an off-the-shelf package of measures that converts cross-border opportunities into results. History teaches us that cooperation across borders is an incremental process that requires long-term commitment. It was nearly sixty years ago that the first cross-border regions, the euroregions, were set up, the Schengen Agreement came into effect already more than thirty years ago and the euroregions have been using INTERREG funding to promote CBC for more than thirty years. In spite of these positive developments, CBC has gone through times of fluctuating interest.

From a quantitative cross-border mobility perspective, the current approach to CBC seems inadequate. In practice, CBC remains something vague that most border residents have difficulty in bringing into lasting focus in their conscious mind. Despite that, a situation in which the national border becomes invisible based on regional mobility data is not realistic, and may even be undesirable, more is required to achieve a structural breakthrough in CBC. This chapter presents the most important results of the study by introducing a set of principles for CBC. The intention of this set is not to provide a comprehensive overview. Moreover, not all findings apply to each cross-border initiative or project. The results outline the main thread. Principles which could help in achieving structural improvement and initiating action.