El Realismo de Leyes Naturales: ¿en qué consiste?

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Publicado 30-11-2017

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Edgar Eduardo Rojas Durán
Facultad de Filosofía Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro
México
Biografía
Vol 37 No 1 (2018), Estudos
DOI https://doi.org/10.15304/ag.37.1.3995
Recibido: 17-03-2017 Aceptado: 22-09-2017 Publicado: 30-11-2017
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El presente trabajo tiene como propósito responder la pregunta ¿en qué consiste el realismo de leyes naturales? Para lograr esto, en la primera sección, se exponen y analizan tres teorías filosóficas de leyes naturales: la universalista, la disposicionalista y la contra-factualista. Esta exposición y análisis se centra en la respuesta que cada una de éstas da a la pregunta ¿qué es una ley natural? Posteriormente, en la segunda sección, se muestran tanto las convergencias y divergencias encontradas en ellas. Finalmente, en la tercera sección, se conjuntan los puntos que comparten para presentar la tesis que las engloba a todas como teorías de leyes realistas. Esta tesis, afirmo, es en el fondo el núcleo de la posición realista general sobre leyes naturales que denomino “Realismo de Leyes Naturales”.

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universales, disposiciones, contra-fácticos, necesidad, regularidades, anti-realismo, explicación científica
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