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Agustín Arrieta Urtizberea
Facultad de Filosofía. Departamento de Lógica y filosofía de la ciencia. Universidad del País Vasco
Vol 35 No 1 (2016), Studies
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15304/ag.35.1.2365
Submitted: 22-01-2015 Accepted: 15-09-2015 Published: 09-11-2015
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Abstract

Noël Carroll, in On Criticism, makes a subjectivist interpretation of David Hume’s aesthetic ideas and theses. In this paper I argue for an objectivist interpretation of Hume’s aesthetic therory. As it is known, David Hume links values (and, particularly, esthetical values) with Lockean secondary qualities. But this link is far from clear. By means of classical distinctions proposed by Kripke I try to shed light on the mentioned relationship between values and secondary qualities. In this way, I show that Hume is more objectivist than Carroll and other authors think. Finally, I try to justify that, in spite of the objectivism, it makes sense, concerning values, to defend Hume´s sentimentalism.

http://dx.doi.org/10.15304/ag.35.1.2365

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