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Ivana Anton Mlinar
Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
Argentina
Biography
Vol. 34 No. 1 (2015), Notes
https://doi.org/10.15304/ag.34.1.1373
Submitted: 2013-09-05 Published: 2014-11-03
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Abstract

Phenomenology comprehends an embodied first person-perspective by distinguishing between body as objectivity [Körper] and lived body [Leib] —both physic body as well as “bearer” of an ego—, that, therefore, reveals itself as the organ of perception and serves in constituent functions. Hence cognitive sciences have taken a series of descriptive elements and perspectives of analysis that, together with recent neurologic discoveries, have promoted conclusions that assume an assimilation or reduction of the first person-perspective to the third person-perspective, of motivation to causality, in short, of naturalization of intentionality. The legitimacy of these conclusions result questionable within the phenomenological frame self that they invoke.

DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.15304/ag.34.1.1373

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