The Irish border proved one of the most difficult issues in the negotiations on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. A persistent point of contention since the partition of Ireland a hundred years ago, it had been put into abeyance by a combination of the historic Common Travel Area, the peace settlement in Northern Ireland and the EU Single Market, which had allowed the disappearance of physical structures. The final agreement leaves important areas of ambiguity but does represent a breach in the UK’s vision of Brexit and a single settlement for the whole of the United Kingdom. It represents the first time that the EU has permitted partial integration in the EU for a region of a non-Member State but the circumstances are such that it does not provide a precedent.
La frontera irlandesa resultó ser uno de los temas más difíciles en las negociaciones sobre la retirada del Reino Unido de la Unión Europea. Un punto de discordia persistente desde la separación de Irlanda hace cien años, había quedado en suspenso por una combinación de la histórica Common Travel Area, el acuerdo de paz en Irlanda del Norte y el mercado único de la UE, que había permitido la desaparición de las estructuras físicas. El acuerdo final deja importantes áreas de ambigüedad, pero representa una brecha en la visión británica del Brexit y un acuerdo único para todo el Reino Unido. Representa la primera vez que la UE permite la integración parcial en la UE de una región de un Estado no miembro, pero las circunstancias son tales que no sienta un precedente.
The history of the Irish border question goes back to the 1921 partition of Ireland following the military and political conflict over Irish independence. An Irish Free State was established in 26 counties of the southern part of the island. Six counties in the north-east remained in the United Kingdom as the autonomous province of Northern Ireland. This represented a very imperfect separation of the nationalist (largely Catholic) and unionist (predominantly Protestant) communities. Catholics made up around a third of the population of Northern Ireland and a majority in two of the six counties. Northern Ireland in practice remained the largest area that unionists could carve out and still retain a majority. Protestants had comprised 10.4 per cent of the population of the 26 counties in 1911, although their numbers had dwindled to four per cent by the 1970s (
Under the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the Irish Free State was formally a self-governing Dominion under the Crown with the same status as Canada. The fact that it was not a Republic sparked a civil war in the south, won by the pro-Treaty side. In practice, successive governments sought to make it look as much like sovereign independence as possible. The Statute of Westminster (1931) recognized the effective independence of the dominions and in 1937 Ireland gave itself a new constitution, downgrading the monarchy. Finally, in 1949, it established the Republic of Ireland and left the Commonwealth. The response of the UK Government was to extend a guarantee to Northern Ireland that it would not be incorporated in the Republic without the consent of its Parliament. The Republic of Ireland would not be regarded as a foreign country and Irish citizens would be treated still as though they were British subjects although, not being citizens they would have no automatic right to British passports. They could vote in UK elections when resident in Great Britain; only if resident in Northern Ireland, they could vote in Northern Ireland elections. Subsequent codifications of British citizenship as a separate category from subjects, including restrictions on immigration, left this Irish exception untouched.
Northern Ireland had its own Parliament (Stormont), which, at the first opportunity, declined to be part of the Free State. It had extensive domestic competences, which have remained the basis of all subsequent devolution settlements there. The Ulster Unionist Party established a political hegemony, forming all governments for the duration of the Stormont regime. Control was assured by the abolition of the proportional representation provided for in the initial statute, combined with electoral gerrymandering, which, for example, allowed the Unionists continuous control of the majority Catholic city of Derry/ Londonderry
During the 1960s, a civil rights movement, demanding the application of British standards of rights, gave rise to renewed nationalist agitation. Violence broke out, with organized paramilitaries mobilizing on both sides (‘republicans’ on the nationalist side and ‘loyalists’ on the unionist side). The British army was sent in to keep order and in 1972 the Stormont regime collapsed and the UK Government imposed direct rule. Political unionism splintered between the old Unionist Party, whose leadership had backed reform, and the intransigent Democratic Unionist Party of Ian Paisley. Nationalism was divided between the Social Democratic and Labour Party, committed to peaceful reform and Irish unity by consent, and Sinn Féin, linked to the paramilitary Irish Republican Army. Smaller parties formed around the loyalist paramilitary groups.
Efforts to resolve the conflict between 1973 and 1999 were focused on a consistent set of themes. First was power-sharing on consociational lines within Northern Ireland. Second was recognition of the right of Northern Ireland to unify with the Republic by consent of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a referendum; nationalists had previously claimed that the only relevant unit was the whole of Ireland. Third was the need for measures to open the border and reduce its practical significance. Fourth was recognition of the north-south dimension, meaning measures to bring the two parts of Ireland together, and of the east-west dimension, referring to measures to bring Northern Ireland closer to the other nations of the United Kingdom. The first effort, known as Sunningdale after the location of the conference at which it was agreed, sought to include the moderates in the shape of the SDLP and Unionist parties. The DUP was not invited as it had shown no inclination to compromise, while Sinn Féin had boycotted the preliminary elections. In the event, the Sunningdale agreement was brought down by a political strike of loyalist workers.
Efforts to restore devolution continued through the 1980s and 1990s. The Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement of 1998 followed cease-fires by republican and loyalist paramilitaries and the election of the first Labour Government since 1979. It sought to encompass all parties, provided that they were committed to peaceful means and democratic participation. Sinn Féin was regarded as a legitimate partner because the IRA had officially abandoned violence, although unionists long disputed the point. The DUP did not accept the agreement but did participate in the new institutions conditionally. Eventually, through the St. Andrews Agreement (2006) it came on board fully. While the agreement, in contrast to Sunningdale, was intended to embrace the extremes as well as moderates, the conditions meant that Sinn Féin and parties representing loyalist paramilitaries could only come on board by becoming moderate. In effect, Sinn Féin and the DUP occupied the ground previously held by the SDLP and the Unionist Party, while participation allowed to overtake their moderate rivals in their respective communities so they, jointly, have led power-sharing governments since St Andrews.
The Republic of Ireland had a nominal claim to Northern Ireland although its 1937 constitution did provide for government in the 26 counties pending unification of the national territory. In practice, successive Irish governments did little to end partition. Indeed, it has been widely suggested that, from an early stage, they had little interest in absorbing what would have been a substantial and politically-mobilized unionist minority and preferred to pay lip-service to unification. UK Governments, for their part, took the view that Northern Ireland was a matter for domestic politics and jurisdiction. The Republic was, however, involved in negotiations for the Sunningdale Agreement. By the mid-1980s, British attitudes had evolved and in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 (
While the two states retained competing claims to sovereignty over Northern Ireland and the UK, for legal purposes, saw it as an internal matter, the political reality is that neither side acted on these assumptions. Neither wanted to take full responsibility for what had become an intractable problem. Polls have long shown a large measure of indifference among the public in Great Britain about whether Northern Ireland should remain in the UK and some positive support for Irish unification, especially in Scotland (
When the border was established in 1922 its exact location was provisional, pending the report of a Commission. In the event, this came to nothing and it has continued to follow the old county boundaries. The border stretches for 499 kilometres and, at various points, curves north, south, east and west. Some 198 public roads cross it in addition to a few private roads and ferry services (
The movement of people has been governed by legally ill-defined set of arrangements collectively known as the Common Travel Area (CTA), many of which are derogations from restrictions that would otherwise apply between independent states (
The economic significance of the border dates from 1923, when the government of the Irish Free State erected customs posts. This aspect of the border was hardened in the 1930s, when the Irish Government of Eamon De Valera turned to protectionism and a mutually-damaging trade war broke out through the 1930s, linked to payments due from the Irish Government as compensation earlier British-financed land reforms. From the 1950s, Ireland began to open up its economy and a free trade agreement with Britain was signed in 1965, following de Gaulle’s veto on UK accession to the European Economic Communities. Both countries were part of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and then joined the European Communities in 1973. With the arrival of the European Single Market in 1993, controls on trade in goods and services were removed altogether. Smuggling was long a feature of the border and continued where there were tax differences (as in agricultural diesel oil). There also remains an illegal trade drugs in people trafficking, often in the hands of paramilitary groups, which sometimes cooperate across sectarian lines (McDonald and Carroll 2020).
Some controls remained for sanitary and phytosanitary measures on agricultural products, applied between Ireland and Great Britain, the logic being that each island was a natural unit for such measures. Indeed, even DUP leader Ian Paisley remarked, during the 1005 Foot and Mouth Crisis in the UK that “Our people may be British but our cows are Irish”. Pro-Brexit politicians were to make much of this as demonstrating that, as border controls exist and can be managed as a purely technical matter, there was little to fear from the end of the EU Single Market. In fact, the restrictions were sectoral and some of them also applied to the movement of livestock across the borders of England with Wales and Scotland.
The establishment of the two jurisdictions in northern and southern Ireland in 1922-3 was accompanied by violence and the border was securitized. Securitization was heightened during the regular campaigns by the successive incarnations of the Irish Republic Army, dedicated to the overthrow of both states. During the Second World War, border controls were imposed between both parts of Ireland and Great Britain, not removed until the early 1950s. During the Troubles between 1969 and 1999, free movement remained but security controls and military infrastructure increased on the border and only some twenty public road crossings remained open.
On the ground, the border remained a factor in everyday life. While larger political, security and economic forces governed its status, citizens approached it in multiple ways, negotiating their own position within it and relationships with people on either side (
The Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement of 1998 was negotiated with the UK and Irish Governments and the political parties within Northern Ireland after a long history of failed efforts (
Indeed, the agreement leaves the United Kingdom in sovereign control of Northern Ireland. While the Republic of Ireland retains an aspiration to unity in the future, it changed its constitution to abandon the claim to jurisdiction there. Citizens of Northern Ireland were invited to define themselves as Irish, British or Northern Irish or any combination of the two and explicitly permitted to hold either British or Irish citizenship or both. The phrase, ‘totality of relationships among the people of these islands’ (first used in 1980) was deployed to soften hard sovereignty aspects and open up new territorial imaginations. Before then, it had been common in the United Kingdom to refer to the ‘British Isles’, which caused offence in Ireland and to ‘Anglo-Irish’ relations, which disturbed many Scots.
The agreement has two aspects, an internal and an external one. The internal aspect is founded on consociational principles. There is a Northern Ireland Assembly elected by single transferable vote. Members are invited (but not obliged) to designate themselves as nationalists or unionists. There is a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive, which must include representatives of both communities. There are mechanisms requiring cross-community consent for certain measures. Specific programmes ensure equity in the police and public services. Powers have been devolved to the Assembly over time. At times when the Assembly and Executive are not functioning, responsibility reverts to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, working through the Northern Ireland Office, and to the Northern Ireland Civil Service.
The external aspect has two dimensions, north-south and east-west. A North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC) provides a vehicle for cooperation between the governments of the two parts of Ireland. It promotes cooperation on a range of policy matters. For east-west matters, there is a British-Irish Council. In order to promote the ‘totality of relationships’, it includes the two sovereign governments together with the Northern Ireland Executive, the Scottish and Welsh Governments, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. This also allows the Northern Ireland settlement to fit, at least in appearance, into an overall pattern of devolution within the United Kingdom.
The European Union played little part in the negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement although it does contribute funding to a Peace and Reconciliation Programme (PEACE). There are references in the GFA to cooperation in European programmes. More important is the fortuitous combination of the European Single Market programme and the peace process and cooperation between the two parts of Ireland. The opening of the economic border promoted cross-border trade. It also facilitated all-Ireland frameworks in issues such tourism (promoting Ireland as a single destination; energy (with a single market); public services; economic development; agriculture. With the issue of the political border put in abeyance, such cooperation could be depoliticized. At the border itself, community relations could be reconfigured and local forms of interaction and cooperation developed. The combination of desecuritization and the removal of economic controls allowed for the dismantling of the physical infrastructures at the border, which had an immense effect on perceptions of the border and local relationships. Joint membership of the EU on the part of the United Kingdom and Ireland also played an important role in relationships between the two states, as ministers met each other regularly at the Council of the EU and European Council, often sharing a common view of the future or Europe, where both were inclined to the market liberal approach. The free movement of people had long been established in the Common Travel Area so that the European provisions for free movement made no difference to the rights of UK and Irish citizens, although they did allow European citizens to move freely across the border.
Relations between the communities in Northern Ireland have remained tense and the power-sharing institutions have broken down for two extended periods. Politically sensitive issues like dealing with the past, language and recognition remain open. While both communities were historically socially conservative, support for same-sex marriage and abortion rights have increased in the Republic and among Catholics while the DUP remains opposed. By contrast, the border was largely taken out of contention. Politicians in the Republic were obliged to pay lip-service to the long-term aim of unification but in practice only the republicans of Sinn Féin made an issue of it. When voters in Northern Ireland were offered a choice of constitutional options including Irish unification, direct rule from London and power-sharing within Northern Ireland, Catholics and those identifying as Irish
Support for the EU in the Republic of Ireland has consistently been high, with the exception of Sinn Féin and a section of the left concerned with sovereignty and the supposed neo-liberal bias of the EU. In the 1972 referendum on accession to the EEC, 83 per cent supported membership on a turnout of 71 per cent. Although there were two negative referendum votes on European treaties, these were rather easily reversed. After some years of membership, it was widely agreed that, rather than detracting from Ireland’s sovereignty, Europe enhanced its status and autonomy as a small state. Opinion in Northern Ireland was more divided. The moderate nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) was strongly in favour of the EEC, which it saw as contributing to relaxing the division of Ireland and consistent with its post-sovereigntist politics. Sinn Féin was opposed for the same reasons as in the Republic. Unionism was also divided. Moderate unionists in the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) were themselves divided but were generally supportive. The DUP was strongly anti-European, on sovereignty grounds and because, for many, Europe was seen as Catholic.
In the referendum of 2016, the UK as a whole voted 52-48 per cent to leave the EU; the figures for England and for Wales were similar. Scotland voted 62-38 to remain. Northern Ireland voted to remain by 56-44 per cent but with a large difference between the communities.
SDLP voters supported Remain by 95 per cent, while Sinn Féin voters were only slightly behind at 86 per cent. By contrast 70 per cent of DUP voters went for Leave as did 54 per cent of UUP voters (
Sinn Féin’s immediate response was to call for a border poll as allowed under the Good Friday Agreement but they were not supported by moderate nationalists or the main Irish parties as the difficulties were too great and they were committed to the GFA. In the following years, however, support for reunification did increase within the nationalist community and by 2018 there was again a plurality among Catholics for unification, overtaking the status quo of devolution with power sharing (Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey). Forty nine per cent of them would vote for unification in a referendum, against 25 per cent who would vote to remain with the UK, but with 26 per cent undecided. Brexit had clearly driven a new wedge between the two communities.
With the Ireland inside the EU and the UK outside, there were obvious consequences for the border; it was also a highly salient political issue (
All involved agreed that nothing should be done to damage the Good Friday Agreement, but this could be interpreted in a broad or a narrow way. There is rather little in the GFA about Europe, apart from some generalities about cooperation and funding; there is no requirement that both states remain in the EU. On the other hand, the EU and Single Market provide the context and conditions for opening the border and largely taking it out of political contention. The development of the Agreement over time (what we might call, to borrow European terminology, the acquis) owes a great deal to the opportunities provided by Europe, including all-Ireland management of energy, tourism and other matters. The removal of the physical frontier has immense symbolic importance and matters for the everyday life of people on both sides. The open border to the south provided an underpinning for the territorial imagination of nationalists, giving an all-Ireland perspective. An open border with Great Britain did the same for unionism. Borrowing terminology from the EU, we might argue that there is a border acquis that has broadened and deepened over two decades and which would be undermined by Brexit.
The position of the UK Government was that Brexit, including withdrawal from the Single Market, could be achieved without harming the GFA. Yet, as negotiations progressed, especially after the fall of Theresa May, it insisted on an ever harder Brexit on the grounds that anything less would compromise its sovereignty. To square the circle, they adopted a narrow interpretation of the GFA, focusing on the letter rather than its subsequent development. They also took a restricted view of the border, focusing on the physical structures rather than the functional and symbolic elements. A repeated slogan was that there would be ‘no return to the borders of the past’. They consequently argued that it would be acceptable to move physical checks a few kilometres away from the border and put great faith in technology to deal with monitoring and inspection. These, however, are all ways of managing the border rather than eliminating it. In the early stages, they also sought bilateral negotiations with Ireland, only to be told that they had to negotiate with the EU (although some technical work was done bilaterally). In its negotiating on the Irish border question, the UK was little constrained but public opinion in Great Britain, which has long been largely indifferent as to whether Northern Ireland remains in the UK or joins the Republic (
Ireland is the EU Member State most affected by Brexit generally. While dependence on the UK market has fallen drastically since 1973, it still accounts for 11 per cent of Irish exports (of which one per cent is to Northern Ireland). The figures for agricultural exports are higher. Equally important, over 28 per cent of containerised Irish goods exports into Europe went via the ‘land bridge’ through the Wales and England (
The Northern Ireland parties were, as usual, divided. The nationalists were adamant that the Good Friday Agreement be upheld in its broadest sense and there be no border in Ireland, even it this meant a border in the Irish Sea between Ireland and Great Britain. Sinn Féin, by now the dominant party on the nationalist side, does not take its seats in the UK Parliament, so weakening its position. The DUP, the largest unionist party, was pro-Brexit despite the threat this posed to the GFA and thus to its own position as leader of the devolved government. It regarded a border of any sort in the Irish Sea as completely unacceptable. In January 2017, the power-sharing Executive collapsed for reasons going beyond Brexit although Brexit had added to the tensions. It was not reconstituted until January 2020, meaning that an authoritative Northern Ireland voice was lacking for much of the negotiating period. At the snap General Election of 2017, however, the Conservative Government of Theresa May unexpectedly lost its majority. It immediately negotiated a confidence and supply agreement with the DUP, greatly increasing the latter’s leverage and putting into doubts it’s the UKs’s own credentials as an honest broker between the two sides in Northern Ireland. There was a brief rediscovery of the Conservative Party’s credentials as a unionist party (its official name remains the Conservative and Unionist Party) but this did not last.
The main concern of the European Union in the negotiations was to ensure that a departing Member State could not retain the full advantages of market access. It also stressed the integrity of the single market, so that it was unwilling to countenance a potentially leaky border in Ireland (
The Irish border issue hardly featured in the referendum campaign in Great Britain and many people appear to have been surprised that it existed and was given such attention in the aftermath. Some Brexiters (such as veteran Eurosceptic
Agreement appeared to have been reached in December 2017 on a formula with three elements. First was a hope that the border would be taken care of in a future trade deal. Second was a wish that a technical solution would be found. Third was a differentiated arrangement for Northern Ireland, keeping it within the regulatory and customs alignment to the degree necessary to safeguard the GFA, until such time as a better arrangement could be found. This became the famous Irish Backstop. In practice, it was difficult to see how a future trade agreement could work unless it incorporated the third element. As for the second, the requisite technology did not exist and in any case a virtual border is still a border. This left the differentiated Brexit and the backstop. As news of the draff deal filtered out of Brussels, the DUP reacted furiously, threatening to use its confidence and supply arrangement with the Conservatives to veto it. The Prime Minister was then forced to downplay the differentiation. The resulting Joint Report (
Prime Minister Theresa May’s Cabinet was deeply divided over Brexit, as was the Conservative parliamentary party. The Chequers Plan of July 2018 sought to get consent from the Cabinet as a basis for negotiating with the EU. May proposed building on the provision for the whole UK to stay in a common customs arrangement to make it part of a permanent deal and also wanted a ‘common rule book’ on regulation, with some provision for the UK to diverge and face the consequences. Several ministers, including Boris Johnson resigned in protest, mainly because of the close relation it implied with the EU but they also made common cause with the DUP in opposing differentiation for Northern Ireland and the Irish Sea Border. In the event, the Chequers Plan did not find favour with the EU either.
With the hardliners out of government the first withdrawal agreement between the UK and the EU was reached in November 2018. It did not provide for a customs union or common rule book but the accompanying Political Declaration envisaged:
comprehensive
arrangements that will create a free trade area, combining deep regulatory and
customs cooperation, underpinned by provisions ensuring a level playing field
for open and fair competition (
The agreement also included a Northern Ireland Protocol, which provided for ‘a common regulatory area comprising the Union and the United Kingdom in respect of Northern Ireland… The common regulatory area shall constitute an area without internal borders in which the free movement of goods is ensured and North-South cooperation protected. … Customs duties on imports and exports and any charges having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between the Union and the United Kingdom in respect of Northern Ireland’
For the
the unique circumstances in Northern Ireland,
including the continuation of the Common Travel Area arrangements, the ongoing protection of rights of individuals in Northern
Ireland, and guarantees that, even in the unlikely event that our future
relationship with the EU is not in place by the end of the implementation
period, there will be no hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland or a
splitting of the UK customs territory.
Once again, this left a wide margin for interpretation. Logically, for the future trade agreement to keep the Irish border open to the same extent as the Protocol did, it would have to include the substance of the Protocol but the UK Government refused to accept this conclusion. Nor were the assurances enough to satisfy either the DUP or the nationalists in Northern Ireland. In the event, Theresa May failed to get the deal through Parliament, leading to her resignation in June 2019. Her successor, Boris Johnson, a leading Brexiter, promised to scrap the Northern Ireland Protocol as part of a renegotiated deal. At the same time, his government moved to a harder interpretation of Brexit, away from customs and regulatory alignment. This made the claim that the future trade agreement would solve the Irish border question even less plausible.
The deal concluded by Johnson in January 2020 ostensibly removed the backstop but only by making it permanent (a frontstop as critics called it). Northern Ireland was to remain within regulatory alignment with the EU and effectively in the customs union, while also remaining within the UK’s customs territory. The DUP, at whose conference in 2018 Johnson had denounced the backstop and any differentiated treatment for Northern Ireland, was abandoned and a border was introduced in the Irish Sea.
The Protocol commits the UK to facilitate the work of the institutions and bodies pursuant to the Good Friday Agreement, notably in relation to Human Rights.
It secures the Common Travel Area, while also stressing Ireland’s commitments under EU free movement provisions. Northern Ireland is defined to be part of the customs territory of the United Kingdom, including for the purpose of free trade agreements with third countries. At the same time, Northern Ireland has customs-free trade with the EU. As there is, unlike the previous draft agreement (Theresa May’s deal) there is no common customs area. This means that there are customs checks in the Irish Sea. No customs duties are payable on good imported to Northern Ireland from other parts of the UK, unless it is at risk of being sent on to the EU, in which case any applicable duties must be paid. Northern Ireland is also subject to EU regulations in a wide range of Single Market areas and state aid provisions. This, also, requires checks on goods moving there from Great Britain. Northern Ireland remains in the UK VAT rules but subject to EU VAT regulations. These rules are enforced by the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU. It is clear, then, that the red lines on which the UK Government insisted from the beginning to do not apply to Northern Ireland.
One concession was made to the DUP, that the arrangement could be reviewed after four years and terminated by vote of the Northern Ireland Assembly. If the decision is taken by simple majority, it can be reviewed every four years. If it gains a qualified majority of 60 per cent and at least 40 per cent in among both unionist and nationalist members, then it cannot be revisited for another eight years. If the protocol is voted down, the sides have to review the situation. In practice, as the DUP is the only party objecting to the protocol, it is highly unlikely that it would be repealed.
Like the overall withdrawal agreement, there is much to be negotiated in practice and in detail and interpretations differ. Boris Johnson initially declared that there would be no checks at the border (ITV, 2019); EU negotiator Michel Barnier insisted that there would (
Brexit was always an ill-defined project, taking harder or softer forms. Theresa May’s Lancaster House speech at the beginning of the process seemed to presage a hard Brexit and thus a hard Irish border. Later, the position appeared to soften as propose a wide partnership with the EU (
Brexit has destabilized the delicate constitutional settlement in Northern Ireland. Internally, it has increased the gulf between nationalists and unionists. Externally, it has brought back to border issue as a matter of contention and put Irish reunification back on the political agenda. The DUP, which had supported Brexit but played down the impact on the Irish border and refused to accept an Irish Sea border, lost out. Nationalists scored a victory by keeping open the Irish land border, even at the expense of imposing a regulatory border between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Of course, there is still a juridical border between the two parts of Ireland but it is less intrusive in practice than the new border within the United Kingdom. The early indications as the new arrangements came into effect in January 2021 were that the Irish Sea border was not a mere matter of invisible formalities, any more than the new border with the EU was (
For the United Kingdom, the outcome breaks the pledge that there would be a ‘Red, White and Blue’ Brexit. As
The domestic political repercussions within Great Britain to hiving off Northern Ireland have been slight. Some Conservative voices complained that Northern Ireland has been ‘annexed’ by the EU but few voters care. The UK Government, instead, has drawn the line at Scotland, refusing a differentiated Brexit as proposed by the
The Irish Government was largely successful in its aims, retaining an open border and cementing its position as a loyal European. Once again, it demonstrated that, by working as part of the EU, it could gain considerably more leverage than though bilateral negotiation with the United Kingdom. This echoes the way it made progress in the 1990s by externalizing the Northern Ireland question by bringing on board the United States Presidency and Congress.
The EU achieved its aim of protecting the border of the Internal Market while supporting the demands of the Irish Government. Indeed, it obliged a departing Member State to erect an economic border within its own territory in spite of the frequent protestations of the UK and repeated pledges of UK leaders. Boris Johnson’s deal in regard to the Irish border effectively conceded the Irish and European case against which he had campaigned and was the most antagonistic to the UK unionist position of all the various proposals that had been canvassed so far. He achieved this because Northern Ireland was not an issue for the British public or even, when it came to it, the Conservative and Unionist Party.
The settlement remains fragile, often ill-understood on both sides and vulnerable to events. Both sides undermined it in the early stages. The UK Government introduced a provision in its UK Internal Market Bill in late 2020. allowing it to disapply any controls on movements between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, while conceding that this violated the withdrawal agreement and international law, as the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland put it, ‘in a very specific and limited way.’ This was clearly not going to help the UK’s negotiations for a trade agreement with the EU (although some ministers seemed to think it would enhance their negotiating position) and, after and the relevant bill was amended by the House of Lords, the Government dropped the provision. In January 2020, the EU Commission announced that it would over-ride part of the Protocol in order the control the movement of Covid vaccine out of the EU via Northern Ireland. They, too, had to back down after an outcry united the Irish and British Governments and all the parties in Northern Ireland.
It is difficult to generalize from the case, because the circumstances of Northern Ireland are unique. The EU has hitherto allowed Member States selectively to opt out of provisions in treaties and non-Member States selectively to opt in. It has allowed regions of Member States to opt out entirely (Greenland, Faroes) or partly (Canaries, Azores). This is the only case when a region of a non-Member state has partially opted in. Not even Northern Cyprus’ exclusion is comparable, since that is a non-recognised territory. The case, rather, shows how the EU has sought to maintain the borders of the Single Market and tightly circumscribe the conditions under which a non-state territory can be partially within the EU’s economic space.
The research for this paper was supported by European Commission research
grant 822304, for the project
Derry to nationalists and Londonderry to unionists.
The name of the state has historically been contentious. Following Good Friday Agreement, the agreed name is now ‘Ireland’ but ‘Republic of Ireland’ will be used where necessary to distinguish it from Northern Ireland.
Although the Isle of Man and Channel Islands are not actually devolved territories but Crown Dependencies.
These are not quite the same.
That is the term for England, Scotland and Wales together.
Support for Brexit is strongly related to identifying as English rather than British.
Which, of course they had previously enjoyed within the EU.