The issue of the functioning of the European security system has become particularly relevant in connection with the escalation of military-political risks on the eastern borders of the European Union, hybrid threats and the transformation of the global strategic environment. The full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine was a turning point that radically changed the European concept of security, prompting EU member states to review their approaches to defense cooperation, defense financing and political consolidation. The major institutional achievement in this reorganisation was the introduction of the Strategic Compass of Security and Defence in March 2022. The Strategic Compass established specific targets on how to build greater capacities in EU crisis management, support defence capacities, become more resilient to hybrid threats and deepen partnerships. It made the political shock of the war a road map of operation and it was the first attempt to describe the assessment of the threat and coordinated defence response in the EU framework. The EU, which has long viewed security primarily through the prism of diplomacy, economic stability, and soft power, is now building a new defense paradigm that places collective resilience, industrial integration, and cyber defense at the forefront ().
One should make a distinction between the intergovernmental and supranational aspects of the EU security governance. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is governed by Title V of the Treaty on European Union, is predominantly intergovernmental in nature, that is, the strategic decision-making in the military domain is taken by the Member States in the framework of the Council and needs the political consensus. In comparison, the increased involvement of the European Commission in defence affairs is not the result of military competence but rather the supranational power of the industrial policy, budgetary tools and regulation of the internal market. The use of instruments like the European Defence Fund (EDF) and EDIRPA hence represent an industrial and economic aspect of security integration as opposed to the relocation of military sovereignty to the supranational plane. This difference is analytically critical to the establishment of the structural change in the European security architecture.
A review of current scientific literature shows that the topic of European security is being actively developed in the works of leading European researchers. In particular, analyze the dilemmas of the EU’s strategic autonomy and outline the risks of dependence on external partners in the field of defense. emphasizes the need to create a coordinated “European defense leap” that would ensure a rapid response to military threats. and point to the need to strengthen the defense-industrial base as a foundation for the sustainable provision of the EU’s strategic needs. At the same time, considers the development of a common security culture as a crucial factor in increasing political cohesion and trust between member states.
Despite the availability of a significant amount of studies, there are still “blank spots” in the functioning of the European security system. This primarily concerns the comprehensive analysis of the relationship between structural integration, defense-industrial cooperation and increased resilience to hybrid and cyber threats. The issues of the effectiveness of existing collective security mechanisms, the institutional role of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the impact of military-industrial initiatives on the European economy, and the coherence of political decisions within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) also require further consideration. The scientific novelty of the study lies in the attempt to systematically combine statistical analysis of defense spending with a qualitative assessment of trends in the transformation of security strategies and institutional interaction within the EU.
The theoretical approach of the research is based on the theory of European integration, strategic autonomy, and security governance. Specifically, the analysis relies on neo-functionalism that elucidates integration as a spillover effect of economic to political and security spheres and liberal intergovernmentalism that focuses on the use of strategic interests of member states in developing common policies. The paper also uses the concept of Integrated Security Governance, which suggests that the modern security regime is developed on the basis of the interaction between supranational governmental entities, the national government, and transnational industry networks. The institutional adaptation theory perceives the transformation of the EU security architecture post 2022 through the prism of organizational adaptation theory, according to which a crisis is seen as an engine of structural and policy innovation. Based on this theoretical synthesis, one can have a systematic insight regarding the effect of a military-political shock triggered by accelerating integration processes, transforming the defense-industrial relations, and reinterpreting the balance between national sovereignty and joint strategic independence in the role of the European Union.
The theoretical value lies in deepening the understanding of the patterns of integration of the European security space, and the practical value lies in the possibility of applying the results to develop updated strategic documents and decisions in the field of collective defense.
The purpose of the research is to investigate the current state and main directions of updating the European security system in the context of growing military-political risks, in particular: to identify trends in the integration of defense supply chains, to characterize the dynamics of defense spending, to investigate the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the formation of a new security architecture, to identify ways to increase the EU’s resilience to hybrid, energy, cyber and information threats, and to propose options for strategic updating by 2030 within the framework of the implementation of the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030.
The issue of the functioning of the European security system is attracting increasing attention from both European and international researchers. Current scientific works focus on the transformation of the European Union’s strategic autonomy, the institutional renewal of defense structures, and the formation of a common political vision of security in response to military challenges. For instance, outline the dilemmas of the EU’s strategic autonomy, emphasizing the risks of dependence on external partners, while proposes the concept of a “coordinated defense leap” that would ensure a more coordinated response to threats. and trace the economic dimension of the integration of the EU defense market, where the key factors are determined by the effectiveness of financing, industrial cooperation, and technological innovation.
considers the development of a common security culture as the basis of EU unity, while focus on the evolution of defence industrial policy in the context of cooperation with NATO. Brøgger’s () study demonstrates the gradual institutionalisation of security governance through supranational coordination mechanisms, confirming the trend towards greater integration in the defence sector. At the same time, shows that the processes of defence market consolidation become systemic only when financial instruments (EDF, ASAP) and industrial policy are combined, while warns against the risks of excessive fragmentation of strategic approaches, which could undermine the effectiveness of joint actions.
A separate area of studies is devoted to the impact of the war in Ukraine on the transformation of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. With the advent of the war in Ukraine, the legal and institutional change of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU has received special attention in the Spanish-language doctrinal discussion. views the EU reaction as a possible epiphany of its external action and states that the conflict exposed its structural flaws as well as its integrative potential that was latent in CFSP. critically looks at the claim on whether the EU has indeed overcome its conservative small power condition, highlighting that there has always been a disconnect between the strategic ambition and operational capability in defence affairs. In addition to this view, examines the speeding up of the strategic autonomy discussion in the war context and stresses the contradiction between the desire to develop a European Defence Union and the historical intergovernmental limitations inherent in the Treaties. Combined, these contributions help make the analysis rich in terms of normative-legal and geopolitical interpretation of the latest events, which places defence-industrial integration and institutional adaptation in the context of a wider argument about sovereignty, autonomy and the boundaries of supranationalisation in EU policy on security.
emphasizes that the conflict has become a catalyst for rethinking the role of the CFSP, while analyzes the strengthening of the functions of the European External Action Service as a coordination center for a new security architecture. Hellberg and examine the restructuring of defense supply chains in Europe, and examines the formation of a new paradigm of political coherence. Additionally, and highlight the spatial and technological dimensions of security related to space systems, digital infrastructure, and hybrid threats.
and highlight the challenges of cyber and climate risks in European defence, highlighting the need for comprehensive resilience. and examine public support for defence integration as a social factor for the stability of the future European Defence Union. The scientific reports of the and the systematise the strategic priorities of Readiness 2030, aimed at strengthening the industrial, technological and digital foundations of security, while and provide statistical evidence of the growth of defence spending and the share of investment components in the budgets of member states.
Additionally, it is worth noting the contribution of institutional and analytical sources that deepen the understanding of strategic trends in the field of European security. Data from provide quantitative confirmation of the growth of arms transfers and the global militarization of the market, which significantly affects the EU’s defense-industrial policy. The analytical reports of the European Parliamentary Research Service (2024–2025) clarify the role of parliamentary oversight in updating the regulatory framework for strategic autonomy, while the Bruegel think tank () develops the economic basis for the integration of the defense industry into the single market. The theoretical generalizations of within the Palgrave Macmillan edition expand the concept of a “European security order”, emphasizing the interdependence of political, territorial and value factors in the formation of the modern security architecture.
Further scholarly studies deepen the understanding of the institutional dynamics of the European security system, especially in the context of the interaction between member states, defense agencies, and research structures. analyzes the evolution of the European security order through the lens of external borders and geopolitical changes, while highlight the formation of the intelligence community within the Intelligence College in Europe as an element of multi-layered security. and complement this discussion by emphasizing the financial aspects of the defense market and the value autonomy of the EU in the process of creating a European Defense Union. Kotsur’s () study highlights the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the continent’s collective security, in particular, the threats to political stability and social cohesion.
propose a digital ontological model for processing security directives, which opens up prospects for standardization of information systems in the defense sector, while show the connection between external threats and citizens’ support for integration in the defense sector. In turn, argue that climate risks are gradually becoming part of the EU security agenda, influencing the planning of defense infrastructure. emphasize the formation of a public demand for “European defense unity”, which strengthens the legitimacy of political decisions within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Taken together, these studies complement the analytical materials of the and , which set a strategic guideline for the transformation of defense policy by 2030, confirming the transition from declarative to integrated security management.
Thus, contemporary scientific thought on the European security system demonstrates a tendency towards an interdisciplinary approach that combines political analysis, economic assessment and technological modernization. However, the problems of harmonizing the strategic interests of member states and ensuring the technological self-sufficiency of the defense complex remain unresolved, which hinders the full realization of the potential of the Integrated European Security Governance model (; ).
The research was based exclusively on the analysis of statistical data published in open official sources of international organizations. , , the , , and the statistical databases (COFOG) were employed to accomplish the objectives. Methodologically, the study draws the distinction of intergovernmental and supranational sources. The information provided by SIPRI and NATO is to reflect the greater inter-governmental and transatlantic security context, especially in terms of defence spending standards and arms sales. Simultaneously, European Commission, EDA and Eurostat publications are associated with the supranational and institutional-economic aspects of the governance of EU security, in particular, defence-industrial policy and internal market regulation. EU defence policy is structurally inseparable, analytically speaking, with the transatlantic security architecture, which explains the inclusion of NATO documentation. NATO materials are, however, not normative sources of institutional competences in defining the EU institutions, but rather, they are used as contextual comparative indicators. These papers showed the dynamics of defence spending by EU member states between 2020 and 2024. All data had official status, were obtained directly from open electronic resources of the mentioned institutions and were not subjected to additional processing or modeling. The methodological basis of the research was a comparative-analytical approach, which involved a systematic comparison of indicators from different years and sources in order to identify trends and correlations between defense spending, investments in industry and the level of integration of security structures. The materials were processed using methods of generalization, statistical comparison and dynamic analysis, which made it possible to recreate the overall picture of the transformation of the European security system in the context of increasing military-political risks without involving primary empirical research.
The modern European security system is in a state of profound transformation, caused by the aggravation of military-political risks arising from Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the escalation of conflicts on the EU’s periphery, as well as the intensification of global competition between the world's leading powers. The European Union is being compelled to shift its focus from its long-standing emphasis on soft foreign policy tools to the activation of defence and strategic mechanisms. There is a gradual shift from declarative approaches to practical strengthening of capabilities in the field of collective defence, as evidenced by the emergence of documents such as the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 (). The war in Ukraine has been a catalyst for unprecedented changes in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), forcing member states to rethink their approaches to collective defence, arms procurement, the development of the defence-industrial base and energy independence (; ). The European External Action Service (EEAS) is playing an increasingly active role in coordinating diplomatic, military and humanitarian actions. These processes demonstrate the gradual transition towards a “Europe of Defence”, within which a system of interdependence between institutions and Member States is taking shape ().
At the same time, the existing European security architecture remains fragmented. Despite the creation of structures such as and the Permanent Structured Cooperation Initiative (PESCO), coordination between EU states is often complicated by differences in strategic interests and levels of military readiness (). Another problematic aspect is the asymmetry in the distribution of the financial burden on defense: only a small part of the EU countries reach the level of spending recommended by NATO – 2% of GDP. This creates the risk of a “double deficit”: institutional – due to insufficient integration, and material – due to limited defense resources (). Key challenges for the European Union today are ensuring technological self-sufficiency, developing a defense industry and creating efficient arms supply chains (). An additional problem is the hybrid nature of threats – cyberattacks, information warfare, manipulation of public opinion, influence on elections and critical infrastructure. Therefore, the issue arises of forming a unified approach to responding to multidimensional risks that combine military, economic and digital aspects (; ).
The growth of military-political tensions has also revealed the need to renew the EU’s strategic culture – from consensual avoidance to proactive action planning. This involves the development of a new security model built on the principles of collective responsibility, multi-level governance and integrated defence (). Thus, the European security system faces a dual task: on the one hand, strengthening internal coherence, and on the other hand, strengthening external resilience to the challenges of global instability and military expansion.
This transformation was operationalised in the Strategic Compass () through the establishment of new targets to achieve, such as the creation of the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5,000 troops, the development of cyber defence capabilities, and increased coordinated investments between defence. In contrast to old methods of declaration, the Compass proposed implementation schedules and monitoring systems, and institutionalised a change in the normative ambition to capability-based planning.
The transformation of the European Union’s defense policy is taking on a systemic character, moving from declarative coordination to real integration in the strategic, industrial and institutional dimensions. The impetus for this process was the escalation of military risks and the need for collective preparedness for multidimensional threats. The EU is gradually building a new defense architecture in which strategic planning, production capabilities and political coordination become interconnected elements. The key objective is to eliminate fragmentation of the defence market, increase joint procurement, expand the production chains and strengthen the EU's defence industrial base (). At the same time, the role of the European Parliament and research and analytical structures is growing, which shapes the strategic vision of European autonomy in the security sector ().
The main directions of the transformation of the EU's defense policy, covering strategic, industrial and institutional aspects (see Table 1), are summarized below, based on analytical materials from the European Commission, the European Parliament, Bruegel and EUISS (; ; ).
Source: compiled by the author based on (; ; ; ; ).
The European Union is gradually developing a three-tiered defense policy model: strategic (planning and readiness), industrial (production, innovation, joint procurement) and institutional (coordination, NATO integration, external partnerships). This model ensures synergy between political decisions, industrial capabilities and defense resources. While national agendas and financing disparities continue to be the primary obstacles, Readiness 2030 and new collaborative projects enable the EU to unite a disjointed system into a cohesive security ecosystem that can quickly mobilise and update its technology (; ).
The Russian-Ukrainian war became a powerful catalyst for fundamental changes in the European security system, provoking a review of the basic principles of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). For the first time in recent decades, the EU was faced with the need to act as a single defense-political entity, mobilizing resources, diplomatic mechanisms and defense-industrial capabilities within the framework of a common strategy. This process demonstrated not only the political consolidation of the member states, but also institutional evolution – strengthening the role of the European External Action Service (EEAS), EDA and the creation of new formats for interaction with NATO, the UN and G7 partners (; ).
Given the scale of the aggression against Ukraine, the EU was forced to expand the functional boundaries of the CFSP, introducing unprecedented sanctions regimes, military assistance programs through the European Peace Facility, and initiatives to rebuild the European defense industry. The European External Action Service acted as a key coordinator of foreign policy unity, ensuring the coherence of EU positions in global institutions and during crisis response Thus, it was the war in Ukraine that became a test of the maturity of European security policy and the starting point for the formation of a new collective defense architecture (; ). The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in this intergovernmental framework has a bridging role, both as chairman in the structure of the Council and as a coordinator as regards the European Commission and third parties. This institutional stance that is a blend of the two, strengthens coherence without changing the inherently intergovernmental nature of CSDP decision making. Table 2 presents the main directions of the war’s impact on the structural evolution of European security, considering the role of the CFSP and the EEAS as institutional axes of this process (see Table 2).
Source: compiled by the author based on (; ; ; ; ).
The Russian-Ukrainian war radically changed the European security paradigm, transforming the CFSP from a predominantly diplomatic mechanism into a multidimensional crisis management instrument. The European External Action Service (EEAS) became the coordinating center for foreign and defense policy, joining forces with NATO, the UN and other partners. Elements of a “European defense space” emerged – a network of structures, programs and mechanisms that provide a collective response to hybrid and military threats. This new security architecture is flexible, adaptive and politically sustainable, allowing the EU to strengthen its position as a strategic actor in the global security system (; ; ).
In 2020 – 2024, EU defense spending increased in a wave-like manner but accelerated after 2022: from €177 billion in 2020 to €227 billion in 2023 according to , and in 2024 – approximately €343 billion according to the . This represents an increase of about 93% compared to 2020 in nominal terms, considering different accounting methods (COFOG in Eurostat and sectoral data from EDA). Additionally, a shift in the structure of expenditure is recorded: in 2023, investments (armament procurement and R&D) reached a record 72 billion euros (about 26% of total spending), and in 2024, defense investments exceeded 100 billion euros, of which approximately 88 billion were procurement and about 13 billion were research and development. In parallel, a significant increase in imports of major weapons systems in Europe has been recorded: according to the SIPRI methodology (TIV), the volume of imports in 2020–2024 was 155% higher than in 2015–2019, reflecting both the renewal of weapons fleets and the build-up of capabilities against the backdrop of the war against Ukraine. Together, these trends indicate a transition from “budgetary inertial growth” to “investment acceleration” aimed at the production and operational readiness of the EU ().
The analysis is based on open official statistical sources for the last five full years. (1) For the dynamics of the EU’s total defence expenditure, Eurostat’s explanatory materials according to the COFOG classification (defense function) are used, containing annual estimates in current prices: 2019–2023; these data ensure comparability between Member States according to the national accounts standard. (2) For 2024, EDA’s consolidated estimates of defence spending by Member States (EU-27) were used, as it is EDA that consolidates sectoral indicators using the methodology of the defence department: this allows reflecting the jump in expenditure and the structure of investments (procurement and defence R&D). (3) EDA indicators for 2023–2024 were used (in 2023 – €72 billion; in 2024 – over €100 billion, including about €88 billion in procurement and ≈€13 billion in R&D) to characterize defence-industrial investments (procurement and R&D). (4) For the arms market, the SIPRI TIV indicator (volume of international transfers of major arms) was utilized, which is suitable for interregional comparisons of dynamics; the text shows the aggregated change for Europe (2015–2019 vs 2020–2024). (5) For the context of the objectives and the burden on GDP, additional consideration was given to materials from NATO and EU institutions on the movement towards/above 2% of GDP and the growth in the share of investment expenditure in the structure of defence budgets. Data collection was carried out by cross-referencing annual bulletins/fact sheets on the websites of Eurostat (COFOG), EDA (Defence Data), SIPRI (Fact Sheet/Database) and EU/NATO reference pages; differences in methodology (sector coverage, periods, revisions) were noted and the analytical conclusions took into account that the 2024 figures for EDA are not identical to Eurostat’s COFOG in terms of coverage ().
A combined table including the fundamental indicators needed to create the graph may be seen below (see Table 3). The figures are given in billions of euros, rounded to the nearest hundredth; decimals are marked with a comma.
Source: compiled by the author based on (; ; ; ).
It is advisable to supplement the summary of statistical results with visualization, which makes it possible to clearly demonstrate the growth rates of defense spending in EU countries. The construction of a graph is important for identifying trends and turning points that are not always obvious when presenting data in a tabular format. In particular, the graphical representation makes it possible to trace the acceleration of dynamics after 2022 – the period of the beginning of the full-scale war against Ukraine, when EU countries radically changed the structure of their defense budgets (). The visual form of analysis also enables to correlate quantitative changes with political decisions adopted within the framework of the White Paper for European Defense – Readiness 2030 and joint initiatives of NATO and the European Commission, which provides the data with a strategic context (Figure 1).
Over the five-year period 2020 – 2024, the EU’s total defense spending increased from approximately 177.00 to 343.00 billion euros (nominally ≈ +93%), with the acceleration occurring in 2023–2024. The investment component has structurally increased: from a record 72.00 billion euros in 2023 to over 100.00 billion in 2024, where the main increase was provided by weapons purchases (≈ 88.00 billion) with a parallel increase in R&D (≈ 13.00 billion). The arms market for Europe, according to SIPRI estimates, shows a sharp import increase in 2020–2024 compared to 2015–2019 (+155%), which correlates with intensive rearmament and replenishment of stocks. Taken together, this means a transition from “peaceful underfinancing” to “military budget mobilization”, with an increasing share of investments and a gradual approach to/above the Alliance’s target benchmarks – provided that procurement coordination, industrial capacity building and alignment of accounting methodologies between COFOG and EDA sectoral reports are maintained ().
The integration of defence supply chains within the European Union has become one of the key priorities of the Common Security Policy after 2022. The war in Ukraine has exposed the EU’s deep dependence on external suppliers of strategic resources, the lack of production coordination between member states and the absence of common reserves. These factors have triggered a major restructuring of the defence industry – from disjointed national systems to an integrated supply, logistics and production network, where EU countries jointly invest, plan and coordinate the production of key components (; ). The modern development model involves the creation of European defense corridors – a kind of industrial and logistics ecosystem that unites enterprises, research centers and customers.
According to analytical reports by and integration processes are concentrated in three areas: production and technological cooperation, institutional interaction and logistical standardization. The main catalyst for these processes is the creation of joint financing funds, such as the European Defence Fund and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) initiative, which stimulates the collective production of ammunition and technical systems. Such mechanisms allow Member States to jointly develop strategic capabilities, reducing costs and eliminating duplication of production. A summary of the key trends in the integration of defence supply chains is given in Table 4.
Source: compiled by the author based on (; ; ; ; ).
The integration of defence supply chains in the EU shows a steady trend towards centralisation of production and logistics processes. The highest results have been achieved in industrial cooperation and financial integration, thanks to the creation of ASAP, EDF and EDIRPA, which facilitate the scaling of production and joint procurement. Notable progress has also been recorded in logistical integration, although the pace of its implementation remains uneven due to the differences in the transport and infrastructure readiness of the states. At the same time, technological integration requires further investment in the digitalisation of the defence industry and cybersecurity. The EU’s collective security measures are becoming more successful overall, but long-term industrial programs and institutional interaction are required to guarantee the system’s steady self-sufficiency (; ).
The growth of hybrid threats, cyberattacks, information manipulation and energy crises requires a comprehensive renewal of the European security system. The European Union, responding to these challenges, is gradually shaping a new security model in which classic military approaches are combined with digital, energy and information strategies. This transformation is aimed not only at defense against direct threats, but also at building resilience – the ability of institutions and societies to effectively recover from crisis events (; ). The EU security system is seen as a multidimensional structure covering political, technological, economic and communication levels, and its renewal should occur through coordinated actions between member states, EU institutions, NATO and civil society (; ).
Based on analytical materials from the European Commission, EEAS, EUISS and expert reports from leading researchers, four strategic directions for updating the European security system can be identified, presented in Table 5.
Source: compiled by the author based on (; ; ; ; ).
The modern European security system requires a transition from a reactive to an adaptive risk management model, in which not only defense but also the ability to recover becomes a key priority. The most promising areas of renewal are cyber resilience, energy independence, information space protection and interagency integration. The EU should strengthen the cyber defense architecture, creating single centers of coordination and operational response, as well as enhance the ability to resist cognitive attacks and disinformation. The integration of energy and digital strategies into a common security policy forms a holistic, multi-level system capable of operating in the new era of hybrid risks (; ).
Improving the strategic framework for the functioning of the European security system by 2030 should be based on the transition from a fragmented approach to a single integrated strategic planning model based on the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 (). The primary task is to form a long-term vision for the development of EU defense capabilities through the introduction of a common “digital security contour” that would unite national strategies, industrial programs, analytical tools and operational standards. This involves synchronizing the strategic planning of member states, unifying approaches to financing defense projects and creating a single European register of critical capabilities. It is also important to strengthen the analytical dimension through constant data updates within the EU Defence Data Hub and Security Knowledge Platform, which will allow for evidence-based policy decisions, rather than political compromise. Such a strategic renewal should also include the development of a defense innovation ecosystem, the integration of artificial intelligence into command and planning processes, and the creation of strategic readiness indicators to assess progress in implementing the common security policy (; ).
At the same time, the institutional strengthening of the European security system requires the formation of a sustainable management architecture capable of ensuring coherence between civilian, military, technological and information components. In this context, it is advisable to move to an Integrated European Security Governance model, within which the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), EDA and the European Parliament function as interconnected components of a common security system. This requires the creation of a permanent Security Coordination Board – a platform for inter-institutional interaction that would ensure monitoring of the implementation of Readiness 2030 decisions, coordination with NATO, as well as the development of partnership formats with EU partner states. The functions of the European Peace Facility and the European Defence Fund should be expanded to support joint defence-industrial programmes and finance strategic stocks. The key principle of the new stage should be resilience through integration, where the European Union acts not as a collection of national strategies, but as a single entity capable of ensuring the security of its citizens, territories and infrastructures in a multidimensional political, economic and cyberspace (; ).
The restructuring of the European security framework should also be evaluated through the poor vision of renewed transatlantic uncertainty after the onset of the second term of presidential leadership of Donald Trump in the US. The politics of burden-sharing in NATO, conditional security assurances, and the prioritisation of Indo-Pacific strategic rivalry has brought back questions as to the long-term dependability of US security guarantees to Europe. Rhetorical and strategic cues by Washington despite the absence of institutional augmentation can still have a substantial effect on the strategic decision-making and planning of European defence.
This changing situation supports the conceptual conflict between transatlantic reliance and European strategic independence. Although the centre of collective defence continues to be NATO, there is doubt about the extent of US engagement and this is further fuelling the EU to work towards building its defence industrial base, deepening joint procurement and enhancing the ability to act independently. The Trump second administration is thus an external systemic factor that influences more integration in the EU security construct indirectly.
Meanwhile, the likelihood of the US involvement in politics decreasing forces the European institutions to redefine the ratio between the intergovernmental cooperation in the field of defence and the supranational industrial coordination. Such a rapidity of the programs as EDIRPA, EDF, and the White Paper regarding European Defence Readiness 2030 can be viewed, however, not only as a reaction to the Russian-Ukrainian war, but also as an insurance policy against the instability of transatlantic relations. This way, European security integration is not only the response to the external military threats but also readjustment to the geopolitical uncertainty within the Western alliance itself.
The results of the research confirm the general trend noted by analysts of and the European Commission: the EU defence system is in a phase of deep structural integration, but the level of its coherence still remains uneven. On the one hand, and emphasize that common financing mechanisms, such as the European Defence Fund or the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), have significantly accelerated the formation of a single defence market. At the same time, draw attention to the contradiction between the economic and political interests of the Member States, which slows down the institutional convergence of defence programmes. Our research shows that, despite the differences, the integration dynamics show signs of sustained growth after 2022: defence spending within the EU has increased by almost 93%, and the share of investment in procurement and R&D has exceeded a quarter of total expenditure. This suggests that, from a practical point of view, the European Union is moving from a coordination model to a “shared security management” model, although this transformation is not yet complete (; ).
Also, the refreezing of transatlantic assurances in the second Trump administration reinforces the view that the integration of the EU defense is not solely due to external military dangers, but also strategic hedging against the instability of alliances.
Strategic Compass is a document between declarative strategic culture and integration of operations (). Its application proves that the dynamics of post-2022 integration is not a reaction but built in a long-term capability framework. Nevertheless, the level at which the Compass aims are achieved in full is yet to be realised with the long-term financial promise and the political agreement of the Member States.
The results also reveal significant differences in the interpretation of the prospects for the EU’s strategic autonomy. For example, and believe that excessive fragmentation of policy approaches may again weaken the collective ability to respond to hybrid and military threats. Along with this, consider the integration of defense policy as an inevitable stage in the formation of Europe’s strategic sovereignty, which should transition to the format of Integrated European Security Governance by 2030. Our findings are consistent with this standpoint since numerical trends confirm that it is the growth of joint procurement, financial integration, and technological interoperability that are becoming the drivers of systemic change. However, the evidence also suggests that technological integration and cybersecurity are developing more slowly than industrial or financial cooperation, creating potential bottlenecks in the future Readiness 2030 system (; ).
Thus, the discussion around the renewal of the European security system boils down to a contradiction between two approaches: a pragmatic one focused on gradual adaptation to threats, and a strategic one aimed at creating an autonomous EU defense identity. Our research confirms that a combined scenario in which hybrid security, cyber defense, and industrial integration complement each other is realistic. However, further studies should be aimed at assessing the qualitative effects of these processes – in particular, the impact of new defense initiatives on innovative development, digital resilience, and institutional coherence of EU security policy. This will clarify to what extent the Readiness 2030 system can truly transform the European Union into an autonomous global security actor, rather than just a reactive coalition of response (; ).
The modern European security system has entered a phase of qualitative rethinking, in which military, industrial, energy, digital and information dimensions form an interconnected new generation security architecture. The results obtained indicate that the European Union is gradually moving from a reactive policy of containment to a model of proactive security integration, in which coordinated strategic decisions, institutional synergy, and joint financing play a key role. The novelty of the analysis is the identification of a stable trend towards the formation of Integrated European Security Governance – a system that ensures not only common defense, but also the resilience of societies to hybrid challenges. The practical significance of the results lies in the possibility of using the proposed analytical approaches for designing defense-industrial integration policies, developing cyber defense, and strengthening the information resilience of the EU. The limitations of the research relate to the time dynamics of the data and the partial fragmentation of statistical sources, which complicates the accurate comparison of indicators between member states. Despite this, the revealed patterns give grounds to assert that the European Union has the potential to become a strategically autonomous, politically consolidated and technologically independent security actor by 2030. Further studies should focus on quantifying the effectiveness of the EDF, ASAP and Readiness 2030 programs, studying the relationship between defense innovation and economic sustainability, as well as identifying mechanisms for harmonizing policy decisions within the CFSP and EEAS. These areas form the basis of the future European security model, in which stability, technological modernization and collective responsibility become equivalent components of strategic readiness.
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